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INTRODUCTION 
General Statement 
An analysis of the revenue system of the City of Manhattan, 
Kansas, the subject matter of this investigation, could have very 
logically and "properly" been undertaken by a student of the 
"specialized field of government", rather than by one interested in 
the "specialized field of economics." 
The Physiocrats, Adam Smith, and the English economists 
of the early nineteenth century ... searchingly considered 
the fiscal aspects of governmental activity ... So far- 
reaching was their influence that later students viewed 
Public Finance as an integral element of Economics. Con- 
ceivably, had the outstanding British study of the problems 
of Public Finance a century or so ago been made by students 
of governmental organization instead of Economics, we might 
today study Public Finance as a branch of Political cience, 
as is to some extent the case in continental Europe. 
Also, some might argue that the accountant, the statistician, and 
the historian -- and even, perhaps, the sociologist, and the social 
psychologist and others -- could have brought into use valuable 
specialized analytical tools and procedures which would have facil- 
itated the possible discovery of various "contributions to know- 
ledge." It might be expected, however, that although the same 
general "evidence" was examined (e.g., the same quantitative time 
series of monetary date) the objectives and ends and therefore the 
questions pondered and the interpretations of the "answers" dis- 
covered would have varied widely, resulting in diverse mirrorings 
lWilliam J. Shultz and C. Lowell Harriss, American Public 
Finance, p. 2-3. 
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of differing aspects of the central features of the subject under 
consideration. 
For this writer, the investigation was an attempt to discover, 
primarily, the "econolpla aspects" of recent revenue trends of the 
City of Manhattan. (Ise's definition of economics as "The study of 
the material requisites of human well-being" seems as good as any.) 
Even thus restricted and "defined," however, the problem of just 
what evidence and material to bring into consideration and what to 
(in effect) ignore was not a simple one. A student of economics of 
a half century ago would very probably have approached a similar 
problem with little qualms. With the brilliant tradition, philoso- 
phy, and analytical techniques, and ideas of the ordre naturel, 
laissez-faire, and hedonism-utilitarianism of the Classicalists as 
the foundation of a seemingly unshakable general economic structure, 
the problem would have been one of simply excavating the data and 
carefully fitting it into the accepted system. 
In the last several decades, and indeed earlier, many funda- 
mental objections have been raised against the main structure of 
orthodox economics by psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and 
other specialists as well as by economists. New offshoots to the 
main stem of economic thought have appeared, each challenging some 
portion of the traditional system. Economists of a new stamp, men 
with a basically questioning, skeptical outlook such as Veblen, 
Hobson, Mitchell, Keynes, Hansen, and Chamberlin -- to name but a 
few -- questioned, examined, and found wanting many of the basic 
assumptions and conclusions of the old system. In view of these 
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developments, the setting up of a framework of analysis is no long- 
er a "cut and dry" matter. The question that runs through any 
economist's mind as he examines a new economic report or treatise, 
especially by an "unknown" is now: "What will he turn out to be -- 
a Keynesian, an Institutionalist, or something else, or will he 
have seen the light and be one of mf convictions?" Professor Lewis 
H. Haney, for example, apparently believes that before the ideas 
and conclusions of any economist can be accepted as "complete" or 
meaningful," the basic philosophical foundations should be reveal- 
ed, e.g., even convictions on such transcendental aspects of meta- 
physics as the problems of dualism vs. monism and idealism vs. 
materialism.2 In other words, he feels that, "All (or at least the 
more important) cards should be on the table." Other economists 
believe this is quite unnecessary; they deem such a procedure to be 
extremely cumbersome and, in the final analysis, unnecessary: let 
the economist be "objective," examine the "hard facts" of the case, 
use the more or less "standard" economic analysis and present the 
logical conclusions. If the result is a genuine contribution to 
knowledge, its merits will be recognized by nearly all of his 
scientific colleagues regardless of the variations of their personal 
philosophies and general outlook on life. 
The Theoretical Framework of the Inquiry 
For the purpose of this inquiry, neither of the above ap- 
----77g0711:713E7i, History of Eapumula Thought, p. 8-20. 
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proaches has been completely accepted. A declaration, of personal 
philosophy, detailing the various economic and "non-economic" 
propositions and ideas accepted will not be offered. On the other 
hand, it is this writer's conviction that an indicative sampling 
of his more important convictions on fundamental epistomological 
and economic theories -- at least those which will constitute 
important "pillars" for the following analysis -- should be offer- 
ed. 
Basically the outlook regarding the possibilities and po- 
tentialities of economics as a "scientific discipline" (in the 
sense that the physical sciences merit that designation) has been 
one of qualified optimism. Inasfar as it follows a basically 
empirical, experimental approach, recognizing at all times that 
knowledge and truth are much more a matter of probabilities rather 
than of certainties, and that a finite series of data can never 
absolutely "prove" a principle or "law", but only establish its 
likelihood, the future of the science (or art -- ?) of economics 
seems bright.. On the other hand, the deductive, rationalistic 
approach cannot be entirely discredited; a course between "the 
rock of the Scylla" of complete skepticism and "the whirlpool of 
the Charybdis" of gross dogmatism is thus the goal. It is felt 
that the economist, and the social scientist in general, must be 
extremely wary at all times. Both the "reductive" and the "se- 
ductive" fallacies must be avoided. 
No matter how logically consistent, granted its own special 
assumptions, or how rigorously detailed and organized it may be, 
if a theory does not "square" with reality in an approximately 
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one to one ratio, it should be discarded or substantially revised. 
Static concepts can be very useful, particularly in meeting static 
situation. But when the "economic game" becomes (to use Chase's 
simile) like Alice's croquet game, "a matter of using a live 
flamingo as the mallet, perambulating hedgehogs as the balls, and 
packs of live, moving, and malicious, playing cards as the hoops," 
the old rules of the game seem rather inappropriate. The notion 
of absolute natural economic laws seems, in the light of the 
history of the past several decades, with its profound insti- 
tutional, technological, and economic developments, to be badly 
strained and shaken -- if not wholly discredited. The extreme 
position of some, e.g., Chase, that the orthodox economics is 
only valid in the realm of the Ivory Towers or in minor, insig- 
nificant phases of the real world is not accepted.3 Nevertheless, 
it is the belief of this student that the relatively young dis- 
cipline of economics, in its present stage, is much more appli- 
cable, and obviously more capable of definite substantiation, 
when it is engaged in limited specific examinations of relatively 
"small" economic problems, e.g., the topic at hand, the examin- 
ation of recent revenue trends of a small city, than when it 
attempts the herculean task of discovering a meaningful expla- 
nation for the major forces and factors at work in, say, the 
national or international scene. In the future, we may hope, the 
economist will discover new and more potent weapons to enable a 
3Stuart Chase, The Proper Study of MalkinA, 1948, p. 198. 
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successful attack on the "grand problems." (Many have argued that 
the "Keynesian Revolution" has provided the key to the understand- 
ing of the overall aggregative economic problems. Although the 
theoretical achievements, i.e., particularly the"superstructure," 
of Keynes and his followers were brilliant, their basic propo- 
sitions have so far remained in the realm of "the unproven and 
the undisproven" -- for this student at least.) 
One basic, but often seemingly overlooked or oversimplified 
problem for the economist confronting any specific problem has 
been the establishment of "ultimate ends" as the goal toward 
which his economic solution is directed. In those cases where 
the goals are "given" the problem could be avoided, but in many 
problems, e.g., the case at hand, the criteria of good and success 
is a vague one. Is it humanly possible to be effectively ob- 
jective in problems dealing with the behavior of other human 
beings? Are there such things as "objective goals" for all or a 
portion of mankind? The setting up of ultimate ends, which often 
greatly influence, if not entirely determine the direction and 
extent of the analysis, and the meanings drawn from the data on 
hand, has been a very delicate and subtle operation -- which would 
seem to fall more in the field of moral philosophy and ethics 
than economics. For the purposes of this investigation the ul- 
timate goals of municipal revenue policy -- for all American 
cities -- will be assumed to be: 
(1) The attainment, in the long run, i.e., allowing for 
varying amounts of long and short-term borrowings, of aggregate 
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revenues sufficient to meet the costs of those services and 
facilities that the majority of the citizens believe their city 
government should provide and have the basic ability and willing- 
ness to finance. 
(2) The "just" distribution of the public burden. (Various 
prevailing notions of revenue "justice" will be indicated below, 
especially under the final topic of the paper.) 
The Problem and the Nature and Extent of the Evidence 
The investigation of the recent revenue trends of the City 
of Manhattan was undertaken at the suggestion of Mr. William B. 
Avery, the recently appointed, and the first, City Manager of 
Manhattan. Following his desires, the expenditure and debt 
history of the city -- important as they have been in determining 
the revenue trends -- have not been made a central part of the 
inquiry. The apparent basic reason for this limitation was a 
very practical one: data on expenditures and debts were accessi- 
ble in existing reports and summaries; the history and even basic 
summary data on Manhattan's revenues, by sources, simply were not 
available. 
Manhattan "revenue" for the purpose of this investigation 
has been defined as "all those gross receipts, primarily -- but 
not wholly in monetary form including other economic 
goods and services (from such federal agencies as the P.W.A. and 
the W.P.A.) -- received by the City of Manhattan from any sources, 
with the exceptions of: (1) long or short-term borrowings; (2) 
general receipts of the City Water Department. "(The term, 
"revenue," has not had a universally accepted meaning, e.g., it 
has been used to include receipts from borrowings as well as that 
from "current sources.") 
The main object of this investigation was the determination 
and analysis of the sources of revenue; it should be emphasized 
that revenues therefore are =au, and not "net." For example, 
the fact that the municipal airport has since its beginnings 
operated "in the red," in the sense that its direct monetary 
expenses exceeded the direct monetary receipts has not affected 
my classification of their monetary receipts as revenue. The 
problem of evaluating the direct and indirect non-monetary benefits 
derived from the airport, or any other municipal facility or 
service, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The main technical difficulty of the inquiry was the secur- 
ings and reconstructing of basic monetary revenue data. All such 
information available was in the form of detailed receipts which 
had been distributed according to municipal department or fund. 
Until January 1, 1952 when a new and comprehensive accounting 
system was put into effect, the city offices compiled no summary 
of total City revenue by sources. As a result, in order to ob- 
tain the basic data upon which an economic analysis could be 
based, it was necessary to completely derive aggregate figures 
from records not designed to directly give that information. (A 
detailed explanation of the derivation of this data will follow 
under, "The Revenue History of the City of Manhattan," below.) 
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The main body of what follows will be a presentation and 
analysis, primarily in quantitative terms, of the monetary record 
of recent trends in the revenue sources of the City of Manhattan. 
However, in order to avoid presenting merely a "summary of the 
bookkeeping," economic cause and effect relationships have been 
suggested. It has been the opinion of the writer that while by 
the nature of his "specialty," the economist in analyzing a 
problem of public finance deals primarily with the monetary 
evidence, at least a notion of the general economic setting (of 
the "immediate area", as well as that of the nation) should be 
acquired before any particular problem can be "solved." It would 
have been very tempting to attempt to encompass such a vast array 
of information covering forces and factors affecting the economy 
of the City of Manhattan that ample material for a series of case 
studies covering the entire scope of the social sciences would 
have been gathered. To avoid such an error and at the same time 
to bring out the fundamentally pertinent causal forces touching 
on and influencing the secular and short-run trends of the City's 
revenue requires a "fine sense of judgment" in the weighing and 
selection of the evidence. It can only be the hope of the writer 
that the decisions made are at least partially "correct." 
A SYNOPSIS OF MUNICIPAL REVENUE PROBLEMS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
In order to make the analysis of the immediate problem more 
meaningful and clear-cut a brief background of the nationwide 
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municipal revenue tendencies appeared to be of value. As a start- 
ing point the writer's preliminary supposition was that the reve- 
nue history of the City of Manhattan represented a "typical case 
study" if not a "normal sample" of the "universe" of revenue 
histories of all American cities. By establishing a roughly 
normal pattern for this universe as a criterion, deviations in 
the Manhattan data could be pointed up and the truth or error of 
this general presupposition determined. 4 
General Secular and (Recent) Short-Term Tendencies 
in American Cities 
Throughout the history of the United States, the trend of 
urban population to increase both absolutely and in relation to 
that of the rural areas has been well established. This has been 
the result and/or the accompaniment of technical, institutional, 
as well as long-term economical developments. Perhaps the single 
most important factor has been the continuing Industrial Revo- 
lution, with its ever-increasing emphasis upon more and more 
minute specialization in production. Specialization, and its 
usual attendant, mass production, normally have involved increas- 
ing centralization of the labor forces toward the municipal areas. 
Other subsidiary long-run changes, e.g., the gradual spread of 
"No attempt has been made to establish this "norm" according 
to a rigid statistical methodology. Only the most general nation- 
wide tendencies will be outlined. 
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the franchise, the secularization of urban peoples away from 
their former idealistic American-Puritanic outlook on life to a 
more materialistic philosophy, the increasing of the average life 
span, and so on, all have resulted in large and growing cities, 
with a coordinate increasing demand for municipal services and 
hence for municipal revenue. 
During the depression of the 'thirties the shift to the 
cities slightly subsided, only to increase greatly in the war 
economy of the 'forties. In the post-war years this trend 
continued to swell city populations to new high levels. Birth 
rates, at an all time low in the 'thirties, rose sharply in the 
early and middle 'forties (see Table 5). 
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Trends of Aggregate Municipal Revenues 
in the United States 
As indicated by the data in Tables 1 and 2, the secular 
tendency has been for the per capita dollar revenue of local 
governments of the United States to rise. However, when the data 
were converted into "1936-1939" dollars in order to obtain a 
somewhat more accurate measure of the "real" changes from year to 
year, the figures indicated an approximate 30 percent drop in per 
capita "real" revenue from the years of the early and middle 
'thirties to the immediate post-war years.5 Could it be possible 
that a new trend was being established in the reduction of local 
per capita "real" revenue? Or, and more likely, this nation-wide 
5Statistics for "municipal revenue per capita" were not 
available for the entire period covered by Table 1; in fact such 
a figure for all the cities of the United States could not be 
found by this student. However, in the fiscal year 1932 the 
"cities ) towns, villages, and boroughs" received 4707 percent of 
total local revenue (Harold M. Groves, Financing Government, 1945, 
p. 55.). If it is assumed that the "cities, towns, etc." received 
about this same proportion of total local revenues during 1915- 
1950, it follows that "average per capita municipal revenue" for 
the United States was a little less than half of the first column 
of Table 1. Similarly, the "average 'real' per capita revenue" 
would be about half of the third column of Table 1. Even if 
actual per capita figures were available, however, its "meaning" 
would be of questionable value as a "mode" of "the typical Ameri- 
can city." This would be due to the great variation from city to 
city; for example in 1946 "Boston and New York spent $110 per 
capita Chicago spent $357 Detroit $80, and Lincoln (Nebraska) 
about $25 per capita." (William J. Shultz and C. Lowell Harriss, 
m. cit., p. 39). In the same year ten (of the twelve) first- 
class cities of Kansas had average per capita expenditures of 
only $11.10 (Jack F. McKay, loc. cit.). The large variation in 
revenues and expenditures was due mainly to differences in 
functions assumed in the various cities. New York and Boston 
make large outlays for education; in Kansas and elsewhere school 
costs are met by special districts with separate budgets. 
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Table 1. Per capita tax revenue of local governments in the 
United States; B.L.S. Consumer Price Index; "real" 
per capita revenue, and index of average per capita 
expenditures of 10 Kansas cities, selected fiscal 
years, 1915-1950. 
Year 
: Dollar : 
: per capita: 
: revenuel : 
B.L.S. 
Cons. 
Price, 
Index 
: "Real" dollar 
: per capita 
: revenue3 
: 
: Index of average 
:per capita current 
:expenditures of, 10 
: Kansas cities4 
1915 10.60 72.5 14.61 
1919 16.29 123.8 13.18 
1923 25.61 97.6 26.27 
1927 34.98 124.0 28.19 
1932 36.02 97.6 36.98 
1933 33.09 92.4 35.82 
1934 34.84 95.7 36.42 
1935 36.46 98.1 37.20 
1936 35.78 99.1 36.02 
1937 34.99 102.7 34.04 
1938 35.44 100.8 35.25 
1939 34.55 99.4 34.80 
1940 34.34 100.2 34.11 100.0 
1941 35.85 105.2 34.04 
1942 34.75 116.6 29.61 
1943 35.02 123.6 28.40 105.9 
144 35.23 125.7 28.23 113.1 
199 45 36.86 128.6 28.70 116.7 
1946 39.06 139.5 28.29 130.8 
1947 41.69 159.6 26.15 138.4 
1948 46.01 171.9 26.82 154.2 
1949 50.81 170.2 29.80 
1950 54.46 171.9 31.63 
'From the Tax Foundation, Facts and Figures on Government 
Finance, 1950-1957, 1950, p. 39. (Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
2From the World Almanac (Ed., Harry Hansen) 1952, p. 688. 
(This index was 18..6 in September 1951, and 189.6 in April, 1952. 
The last figure from Business Week, May 31, 1952. 1936-1939 
= 100,0.) 
iCalculated by dividing the first column by the B.L.S. 
consumer price index. 
Calculated from "average per capita expenditure of 10 
cities in Kansas for current operations." (From Jack F. McKay, 
Bureau of Government Research, Recent Trends in City Finance, 
Table No. 7, p. 31.) 1940 . 100.0; the actual dollar amount for 
1940 was $9.51. Data on revenue per capita was not given. 
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Table 2. Summary of municipal revenues and borrowing for cities 
having 1940 populations over 25,000, selected years, 
1942-1949. 
Total general revenue 
& borrowing 
"Real" gen. rev. 
& borrowing 
General borrowing 
. : Percent . . . . 
: 1949 : 1947 : 1945 : 1943 : increase 
: 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. ;1942 to 1949 
(amounts in millions) 
$4,509 $3,630 $2,821 $2,639 ..* 
(2,698)(2,275) (2,198) (2,142) 
472 324. 106 48 
Total general revenue 4,037 3,306 2,714 2,591 5,504 
Taxes, total 2,793 2,307 1,971 1,946 Yi-.1 
Property 2,154 1,866 1,712 1,711 27.8 
Sales 393 263 128 110 223.2 
Licenses & other 246 178 131 124 87.9 
Aid from other govern. 817 642 485 437 82.6 
From state only 764 607 450 402 82.4 
Charges and misc. 426 357 258 209 100.4 
Source: International City Managers Association, Murliciall 
Yearbook, 1951, p. 206. (Data in parentheses represent "total 
general revenue & borrowing" in "real" dollars, calculated by 
dividing through by the B.L.S. consumer price index.) 
*Data not available. 
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decline was explainable in terms of short-term factors: During 
the depression of the 'thirties, the federal and state govern- 
ments granted substantial aids and services that were withdrawn 
in the prosperous 'forties. Municipal construction projects de- 
clined sharply during World War II causing a decreased demand for 
revenue. After the war the pressure for more municipal services 
and capital construction was renewed but the willingness to "pay 
the bill" appeared to have declined as evidenced by the decline 
in "real" dollar per capita revenue at a time when current ex- 
penditures per capita were rapidly rising, by the rapid increase 
in municipal borrowing. (See Table 2 and the two last columns of 
Table 1). (The large increase of debt in the post-war years la 
=ell would not necessarily indicate a disinclination to "pay 
the current bills," and, in fact, a large part in the increase 
was justified by capital expenditures.) The apparent discrepancy 
in the "real" trends for all local government revenue (Table 1) 
and municipal revenue for cities over 25,000 population (Table 2) 
can be largely explained by the fact that the latter data have 
not been reduced to a per capita basis to take account of the in- 
crease in population over the period. 
Trends of Specific Municipal Revenue Sources 
in the United States 
The Property Tax. The mainstay of local revenue in this 
country has, since early in the nineteenth century, been the 
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general property tax -- "one of the few peculiarly American 
products." 6 In 1932, it produced 91.9 percent of the tax revenue 
of the "cities, town, villages, and boroughs" of the United 
States.7 Since the early 'thirties, however, its relative im- 
portance has considerably declined. In 1949 it produced less than 
54 percent of the revenue of cities whose populations had been 
25,000 or over in 1940 (see Table 2), less than 59 percent of the 
revenue of 10 first-class Kansas cities (see Table 3) in 1948 and 
less than 45 percent "of the revenues of all second-class cities 
in Kansas" for the year 1947. 8 
Without going deeply into the theoretical and practical 
criticisms and defenses of this traditional "chief provider" of 
American municipal revenue its principal criticisms and defenses 
can be summarized: 
Criticisms 
-- 
(1) It has become increasingly obsolescent as a fair 
measure of distributing the tax burden, i.e., it has become more 
regressive and less a measure of the ability-to-pay. 
(2) It has developed, or never corrected notorious adminis- 
trative weaknesses, especially in the universal but uneven, 
undervaluation of property value. 
6Harold M. Groves, Financing luarnmat, Rev. Ed., 1945, 
p. 22. 
711314., p. 55. 
8Bureau of Government Research, University of Kansas, A 
Comprehensive Planning Surve y of Newton, Kansas, 1951, p. 53. 
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Table 3. Percent distribution of general revenues of 10 first- 
class cities in Kansas by sources of revenue, 
selected years, 1940 - 1950. 
Year 
Local taxes Non-taxes 
:Misc.:Total 
: 
: 
:Proper-:License:Shared: 
:ty priv-:state : 
:fledge :taffies : 
Fines 
and 
fees 
: : 
:Charges: 
: : 
Trust 
fund 
rec. 
1940 75.81 5.93 6.58 2.01 5.14 2.34 2.19 100.00 
1943 74.78 5.94 7.21 3.23 4.82 2.79 1.23 100.00 
1944 73.48 .6.21 9.31 2.94 4.87 2.02 1.16 100.00 
1945 68.31 6.44 12.82 3.85 4.85 2.00 1.74 100.00 
1946 65.91 6.32 13.30 6.00 4.23 2.51 1.73 100.00 
1947 59.98 7.97 12.60 6.57 7.58 2.83 2.45 100.00 
1948 58.85 8.37 12.72 8.09 6.38 3.23 2.36 100.00 
1949* 68.02 8.50 10.38 7.03 3.49 1.02 1.56 100.00 
1950* 66.72 8.35 12.94 6.33 3.77 .93 1.02 100.00 
Source: Jack F. McKay, au. cit., p. 17. (Bureau of Govern- 
ment Research, University of Kansas. 
*Budget estimates only, not actual amounts. (The cities are: 
Atchinson, Parsons, Coffeyville, Fort Scott, Hutchinson, Lawrence, 
Leavenworth, Pittsburg, Salina, and Topeka, i.e., every first- 
class city in Kansas except Kansas City and Wichita.) 
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(3) It has been a discouragement to investment in urgently 
needed housing. 
(4) Its yield has been characterized by increasing inelas- 
ticity. 
Defenses -- 
(1) It has been well adapted for local control -- a feature 
which has been especially appealing to those with the spirit of 
home rule and aversion for the recent tendency toward central- 
ization in government. 
(2) Its alternatives, e.g., the sales tax, have been be- 
lieved by many to be even more inequitable. 
(3) It has provided large and fairly dependable and pre- 
dictable revenues. 
(4) It is capable of many administrative improvements. 
As Professor Groves concludes, 
Although the general property tax is cracking badly in 
places, it is probably destined to continue for many years 
as a major, if not the major, source of public revenue in 
the United States. 
klia:Emnuty Taxes. The data in Tables 2 and 3 provide a 
fairly good outline of recent non-property tax trends throughout 
the United States, and particularly of first-class Kansas cities. 
However both "lump together" the data of many cities. In order 
to indicate the considerable variation from the general pattern 
the following survey is presented: 
In terms of use by the 1,228 cities in the United States 
9 Harold M. Groves, on. cit.; p. 118. 
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with populations over 10,000 (in 1940) the more important locally 
levied non-property taxes in 1950 were: public utility taxes 
(259 cities); gross receipts business taxes (196); admission 
taxes (182); motor vehicle taxes (113); retail sales taxes (89); 
cigarette and tobacco taxes (62); gasoline taxes (39); alcohol 
beverage taxes (34); income taxes (24); tax on property transfers 
(19); and hotel taxes (5). In all some 541 cities or )i)i percent 
of the cities over 10,000 population used one or more of these 
non-property taxes.1° 
For some purposes a more meaningful ranking of "importance" 
would be according to aggregate yields. However the data avail- 
able has not been complete; many cities have not reported. Never- 
theless the following partial data seems to be indicative of the 
diverse nationwide story. 
The tax with the greatest apparent yield has been the retail 
sales tax. The 67 cities reporting collected a total of 
$186,431,000 for the year 1950. Of this amount, the City of New 
York alone accounted for some $132,206,800. Seventeen cities 
which reported income tax revenue collected a total of $63,897,800. 
Philadelphia's collections from this source amounted to 
$37,500,000. The gross receipts tax yielded $93,6697400 to the 
147 reporting cities; this tax is most frequently used by the cities 
over 500,000 (39 percent). One hundred thirteen cities reported 
10Robert L. Funk, "Municipal Non-Property Taxes," Inter- 
national City Managers Association, The Municipal Yearbook, 
(Clarence E. Ridley and Orin Nolting, Eds.), 1951, p. 189-194. 
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receiving $11,198,000 for theatre admission taxes, including 
$3,700,000 by the City of Philadelphia and $1,975,000 by Chicago. 
Washington, D. C. received $10,190,400 from her four cent per 
gallon gasoline tax, which represented 70 percent of the total 
collections from this source of the 39 cities reporting. The 
motor vehicle tax (distinct from taxes under the ad valorem basis) 
was the source of $7,292,100 for 76 reporting cities. Thirteen 
cities reported alcoholic beverage revenues aggregating 
$4,227,100 -- 65 percent by Washington, D. C. Significant data 
were not available for cigarette and tobacco taxes, hotel room 
taxes, and property transfer taxes; however in Philadelphia the 
latter, at a rate of five cents per $1000 value transferred, was 
said to yield some $500,000 a year.11 
State and Federal Grants-in-Ala. 
Grants-in-aid and centrally collected, locally shared 
taxes differ in several respects. The customary criterion 
of differentiation is that the grant-in-aid is distributed 
by appropriation, whereas the shared tax is apportioned 
according to fixed percentages of the yield of a particular 
tax. In the case of an aid, the amount distributed is 
largely independent of the yield of a particular tax; in 
the case of a shared tax, it is entirely dependent upon such 
yield... At times the two do not differ by a very wide 
margin.12 
Revenue from the higher governments has had a marked increase 
in the past few decades. Total state grant-in-aid to local units 
(for specified functions) rose from $58.3 million in 1902, or 7.5 
percent of total local revenue, to $518.7 million in 1932, repre- 
1114 
12Harold M. Groves, 22. cit., p. 517. 
illiam J. Schultz and C. Lowell Harriss, cm. cit., p. 719. 
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senting 9.9 percent of total revenue, and to $1,590 million in 
1948 which comprised 17 percent of total local revenue in the 
latter year.13 These grants have been almost wholly for the 
purposes of aiding education, highway construction and mainte- 
nance, and social welfare. Since the school districts and 
counties rather than the cities perform the greater part of these 
functions, the latter have received only a minor portion of the 
total grants. 
In the 1930's the federal government provided substantial 
aid directly to the local governments largely in the form of 
making available the services of employees of the federal relief 
and public works agencies, e.g., the P.W.A. and the W.P.A., for 
municipal construction projects -- on an "emergency basis." 
"Federal aids are predominantly for welfare, with highways and 
education following in order."14 Although total federal aids ex- 
ceeded $2 billion in 1935, after which they greatly declined as 
their welfare relief function was shifted in large part from the 
states and counties, etc., to special federal agencies, most 
cities received little or no direct (monetary) aid. However, 
many grants for airports, hospitals, and school lunches did go 
directly to the cities. During World War II special wartime 
grants, $270 million in 1945, were made for airport construction, 
the training of defense workers, and other special purposes. The 
exact amount of these funds received by the cities was not dis- 
13William J. Schultz and C. Lowell Harriss, loc. cit. 
14-Harold M. Groves, gm. cit., p. 521. 
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cussed; however, they cannot have been important -- relative to 
total municipal revenues. Federal grants to the cities for air- 
ports and hospitals and a few other special purposes have been 
important since 1939. 15 A seven-year expenditure program of 
$500 million in all states and localities was approved in 
1946.16 
Other Municipal Revenue Sources. In addition to local tax 
revenue and federal and state aid there have been other more or 
less important sources of revenue: licenses, fines and fees, 
service charges, profits from municipal-owned utilities, and sun- 
dry minor sources. For the larger cities, taken as a group (see 
Table 2 above) this source has gradually increased in importance, 
producing about twice the proportion of total revenue in 1949 as 
in 1942. The data for the 10 Kansas cities showed the same 
general trend until 1948 (see Table 3 above) when the budget 
figures indicated a sharp drop in the importance of most of the 
items in this category. 
Conclusions on the Major Factors and Issues Affecting 
Municipal Revenue in the United States 
As indicated above (p. 12-16) the general property tax has 
been gradually losing its traditional position as the dominant- 
source of municipal revenue. Conclusions on the. alternative 
1William J. Schultz and C. Lowell Harriss cit., p. 747 16 7 Ibid., p. 80. 
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sources can be summarized under the following headings: (1) 
locally initiated and administered non-property taxes and non-tax 
revenue; (2) state-collected and administered, city-shared taxes; 
(3) grants-in-aid and other aids by state and federal governments; 
(4) varying combinations of the above. (The alternative of 
transfer of municipal functions to other governments will not be 
discussed.) 
Locally Initiated and Administered Non-ProDerty Taxes and 
Non-Tax Revenue. According to one student of municipal finance, 
Dr. Homer H. Hamner, 
Recent city policy makers have established a new trend. 
In effect they seem to have resolved that future reliance on 
needed revenue increments will henceforth be placed on new 
local tax sources rather than on substantial property tax 
increases or even increasing state aids.17 
Apparently Dr. Hamner had considerable evidence to support 
this latter contention (the implication that new local taxes will 
be more important than "state aids.") If he restricted the 
latter term to grants-in-aid, as that classification is normally 
used, -- and this point is not clear -- there can be no quarrel 
with his thesis. However, if he included state-shared revenue, 
a strong case could be presented against his contention. For 
example, the data presented in Tables 2 and 3 above indicate that 
state-shared revenues have been increasing at a substantially 
faster rate than local non-property tax revenue. 
Nevertheless the latter has been becoming increasingly 
17Homer H. Hamner, Municipal Finance Problems of the City 
of Glendale, California, 1949, p. 292. 
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important. State-shared taxes have had the advantages, and the 
disadvantages, inherent in geographically and economically 
restricted political units. In sum, they have had the advantages 
of placing the responsibility of rendering revenue policy-making 
and administrative decisions upon the same individuals in charge 
of directing expenditures, thus presumably cutting down on waste 
and extravagance. They have had the disadvantages of lack of 
professional training and experience usually associated with those 
in charge of policy-making and administration of the larger 
governmental unit. 
One remarkable fact, noted above, p. 19, was that in 1950 
only 44 percent of the cities over 10,000 population used one or 
more of the (eleven mentioned above) main non-property taxes. In 
many cases the obvious reason has been lack of state statutory 
authorization. Many states have been extremely hesitant about 
granting their political subdivisions new taxing power, typically 
reserving the most likely new sources for themselves. However, 
this is apparently only a partial explanation. Many cities with 
the statutory blessing have failed to put the "new-type" taxes 
into effect due to various and sundry reasons. There have been 
political difficulties to the enactment of a tax which apparently 
may hurt certain economic interests. There has been much in- 
action simply as the result of inertia. City officials usually 
have preferred to "wait and see"; traditions are very hard to 
change. Some taxes and local non-tax revenue quite successful in 
certain climes and areas are not suitable to other cities due to 
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lack of size, geographic factors, and so on. 
State-Collected, Citv 
-Shared Taxes. As indicated above, 
state-shared revenues have expanded at a remarkable rate in the 
past two decades (see Tables 2 and 3 above). Apparently these 
"hybrid" sources of revenue have palliated, in great part, the 
advocates of home rule and at the same time have taken advantage 
of superior taxes (at least in the quantity of yield) which are 
administratively inefficient, if not practically impossible, in 
smaller cities. The more important shared taxes -- many of which 
are extremely regressive -- are the sales tax, the cigarette tax, 
liquor tax, motor fuel tax, motor vehicle tax, personal income 
tax, and corporation income tax.18 (The justification for the 
motor fuel and motor vehicle tax has been that they come under 
the benefits-principle inasmuch as the revenue obtained is nearly 
all expended in maintaining the street and highway system.) 
Grants-ia-aid by State and Federal Governments. These were 
relatively unknown as a source of municipal revenue until the 
depression of the 'thirties. During that period they played an 
extremely important emergency role. The advantages claimed for 
this type of revenue over new local taxes have been similar to 
the arguments raised in favor of shared taxes: e.g., the superior 
administration of a single central unit; the fact that new local 
taxes tend to increase trade barriers, which are already an 
annoying problem, etc. This source is apparently "here to stay", 
l8William J. Schultz and C. Lowell Harriss, 2n. cit., Table 
36, p. 712. 
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now as a minor, but potentially as an important municipal revenue 
source. 
Various 22mhlaaIlau of the Above Alternatives. As might 
have been expected in a basically political arena where the 
decisions have been primarily the result of the interaction and 
pressures of various more or less conflicting economic groups and 
political alliances rather than the culmination of a basically 
"rational" approach, no single one of the above alternatives has 
secured a complete "victory" over the others. All have made 
advances at the expense of the property tax. The old maxim of 
attempting "to get the most feathers with the least squawking" 
seems to have been the order of the day. Feeling the heavy 
pressure of existing taxes, local, state and federal, the urge for 
relief -- somehow, some way -- has been extremely strong. As a 
result tempers have risen, many heated accusations have been 
scattered hither and yon; and efforts of the "tax experts" to 
bring about a basic tax reform along "economically sound and 
rational" lines have been largely thwarted in the general emotion- 
al confusion. (Of course, the explanation for this dilemma may 
be that "which taxes are economically sound and rational, and 
which are not" has been a moot point. The answers of the "tax 
experts" have been far from unanimous.) 
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SOME INDICATORS OF MANHATTAN'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
AND RECENT ECONOMIC TRENDS 
Before attempting an economic analysis of the revenue trends 
of the City of Manhattan, it seemed profitable, if indeed not 
mandatory, to establish at least a first approximation of Man- 
hattan's basic economic structure. In addition to nationwide in- 
stitutional and economic forces and pressures outlined in the pre- 
ceding section every city, obviously, has its own peculiar eco- 
nomic "facts of life" which must be recognized if realistic 
queries about revenue trends are to be put and conclusions 
arrived at. This survey will be more descriptive than interpre- 
tative although summary conclusions will be offered. 
The Geographic and Climatic Setting 
Manhattan, Kansas, first settled in 1854 ( "when the steamer 
Hartford, which left Cincinnati, became stranded on the Kaw river 
just above the mouth of the Blue") was incorporated as a second- 
class city on February 1, 1857. 19 Located in the Kaw valley 
some 55 miles west of the state capital and 11 miles east of Fort 
Riley, Manhattan has enjoyed the varying but "invigorating" 
climate of the Central Great Plains area. For the period 1898 to 
1942 her average mean temperature was 55.3 degrees, with a maxi- 
mum of 116 degrees on August 13, 1936 and a minimum of -32 
1-9Quotation from Kansas Facts, 1933, p. 251. 
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degrees on February 12, 1899. Over this period Manhattan has 
averaged 146 cloudy days, 67 partly cloudy and 152 clear days a 
year. Her "normal" annual precipitation has been 32.3 inches; 
however this has varied considerably over the years and the 
seasons -- from the serious droughts during much of the 'thirties 
to the excessive downfalls which helped to cause the floods of 
1903, 1908, 1935, and 1951.20 
The latter flood was by far the most disastrous to the econ- 
omy of Manhattan and the surrounding area. Within the city 
approximately 2500 homes and 347 business establishments were 
damaged or destroyed. The damage to City facilities alone, e.g., 
"70,000 lineal feet of sanitary sewers were full of sand and silt 
and twenty major breaks in the sanitary sewer system", totaled 
approximately 1.5 million. Damage to residential areas was $8.5 
million; business places suffered a $12 million loss, and schools 
$ .5 million -- for a total of $22.5 million.21 For a city with 
an assessed tangible property valuation of $19,671,237 in 1951 
this was a serious blow, the effects of which will probably be 
influential for many years to come. 
20-Report 
of the Kansas State Board 2L Azricultaral "Climate 
of Kansas", June, 19+-2, cited by R. H. Breckenridge, An Indus- 
trial Survey of Haphattarl, Kansas, July 1949, p. 60. 
2 William B. Avery, The Disaster Emaraajps Manhattan, 
Kansas, (a mimeographed reprint of the article in Municipal 
Finance, May 1952, p. 154-157.) p. 4. 
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Manhattan's Population Trends 
The population data (see Table 4, below) for the period 
1880-1952 indicate that the secular nationwide trend of municipal 
growth has generally prevailed in Manhattan. The data in Table 
5, below, indicate that Manhattan's birth rate, over the period 
1930-1951 has been substantially above the national trend, 
particularly since about 1941. The computed rates may be sub- 
stantially higher, however, due to probable non-inclusion of a 
large number of Ft. Riley personnel (who are usually quite 
transient, averaging only a few months stay) as part of Man- 
hattan's "average total population." On the other hand, the fact 
that the wives of these military personnel have had access to the 
Ft. Riley hospital facilities practically free of charge may have 
reduced the effect of this factor. (Another important factor has 
been the births in the city hospitals by nearby rural women.) 22 
The local data are quite "uneven" and erratic, especially when 
compared with the national figures; this is very likely because 
of the relatively small size of the "sample"; i.e., national 
figures are "smooth" because of extremely large population in- 
volved. This same characteristic has been found in almost all 
data assembled; the "life" of a few thousand individuals has been 
more unstable than the average, or total, "life" of many millions. 
22The student inhabitants of college housing have contributed 
greatly to the birth totals. 
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Table 4. "Permanent Manhattan population," Kansas State College 
Student enrollment, and estimated "average total" 
populations in Manhattan for selected years, 1880 - 
1952. 
Year 
"Permanent" 1 : 
population : 
: 
Kansas 2 
State 
students 
: Estimated3 
: "average total 
: population" 
1880 2,105 267 2,292 
1890 2,438 593 21853 
190o 3,215 1,321 4,140 
1910 5,722 2,407 7,407 
1915 6,796 3,314 9,116 
1920 7,989 3,395 10,365 
1927 10,831 3,878 13,546 
1928 10,940 3,879 13,656 
1930 10,115 4,045 12,947 
1931 10,136 3,928 12,886 
1932 9,773 3,359 12,124 
1933 10,067 2,928 12,117 
1934 10,288 3,436 12,693 
1935 10,537 4,261 13,520 
1936 10,738 4,457 13,858 
1937 11,209 4,695 14,425 
1938 11,106 41800 14,466 
1939 11,117 4,910 141554 
1940 11,359 4,902 14,790 
1941 11,713 4,479 14,848 
1942 11,776 3,861 14,479 
1943 13,579 3,786 16,229 
1944 12,223 2,064 13,668 
1945 12,868 5,052 16,404 
1946 12,051 7,814 17,521 
1947 13,875 8,166 19,591 
1948 13,484 8,366 19,340 
1949 15,132 7,834 20,617 
1950 14,269 6,867 19,076 
1951 14,005 6,20o* 18,345 
1952 141000* 5,50o* 17,850 
1From the Manhattan City Clerk's records, data originally 
compiled by the Riley County Clerk. 
2From the Kansas State College Bulletin, July 1, 1951, 
p. 365-6. Totals include the regular school year plus the summer 
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school enrollment, beginning in the summer session of each year 
and including the following spring semester until 1944; since then 
beginning with the fall semester and ending in the following 
summer session. 
Calculated by adding the first column to 70 percent of the 
second column, an arbitrary corrective factor to take into 
consideration: (a) the summer decline in the student enrollment; 
(b) those students that were permanent Manhattan residents and 
were thus included in the first column, about 8.5 percent in 1949 
according to sampling of Roval Purple; and (c) students commuting 
to the campus from homes some distance from Manhattan, and hence 
who were not much of a factor in the economic life of the city. 
The resulting figure seemed more "realistic" than either the first 
column or a simple addition of the first two columns as the 
"average economic population" of the city. However, in recent 
years, i.e., since about 1941, the figures may be low to lack of 
inclusion of Ft. Riley military personnel. 
*My estimates, assuming about a 10 percent decline in the 
student enrollment each year. 
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Table 5. Live births, birth rates per thousand population, 
deaths, and deaths per thousand in the City of Man- 
hattan and birth and death rates in the United 
States, 1930 - 1951. 
Year 
Manhattan 
. 
. : 
: U. S. 
: Manhattan 
: U. S. 
death 
per M5 
: Total 
1. 
Birth 
: births : per 111 
: : 
: births : 
: per M3 : 
: : 
Total,: Deaths : 
deaths -Ls per M2 : 
: : 
1930 246 19.0 - 164 12.7 - 
1931 258 20.0 - 162 12.6 - 
1932 255 21.0 - 140 11.6 - 
1933 262 21.7 - 179 14.8 - 
1934 241 19.0 - 174 13.7 - 
1935 255 18.9 16.9 161 11.9 10.9 
1936 259 18.7 16.7 122 8.8 11.6 
1937 259 18.0 17.1- 185 12.8 11.3 
1938 309 21.4 17.6 186 12.9 10.6 
1939 363 24.9 17.3 164 11.3 10.6 
1940 322 21.8 17.9 167 11.3 10.7 
1941 415 27.9 18.8 198 13.3 10.5 
1942 386 26.7 20.8 185 12.8 10.4 
1943 474 29.2 21.5 165 10.2 10.9 
1944 427 31.2 20.2 196 14.3 10.6 
1945 441 26.9 19.5 143 8.7 10.6 
1946 589 33.6 23.3 183 10.4 10.0 
1947 741 37.8 25.8 174 8.9 10.1 
1948 764 39.5 24.2 172 8.9 9.9 
1949 731 35.5 24.0 201 9.7 9.7 
1950 730 38.3 23.5 217 11.4 9.6 
1951 754 41.1 - 204 11.1 - 
'From official records of births and deaths within the city 
limits kept by the Manhattan City Clerk, includes live births 
only.n 
'Calculated by dividing total births by estimated "average 
total population" from Table 4. 
3National Office of Vital Statistics, from World Almanac, 
1952. 
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Table 5 indicates that Manhattan's death rate has, on the 
average, been slightly higher than the average national rate. 
For the year 1950, the average death rate in Kansas was 10.1 per 
thousand population (see Table 5), higher than the national rate 
but lower than that of Manhattan. 
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Manhattan's Trading Area 
One of the most important single elements making up the 
total "effective demand" for economic goods and services in Man- 
hattan have been the students, faculty, and other employees of 
Kansas State College. In the year 1950, the student enrollment 
of 6,867 very likely spent an aggregate of over $3 million (an 
estimate based on a per student spending of about $50 a month 
during the school year). In that year the faculty's payroll 
amounted to some $3,938,617 and other college employees received 
1,534,196. A goodly proportion of these amounts, which total 
over $8.4 million was very likely spent in the Manhattan market.24 
Another considerable portion of the total demand was likely 
contributed by Ft. Riley military and civil service personnel. 
Accurate data on their purchasing power was not obtainable; how- 
ever, it was widely reported that at one time in 1944 over 40,000 
soldiers were stationed, or were in training, on the Fort. 
The farm and village population in Riley county and other 
;world Almanac, loc. cit. 
29-Data on faculty and other employees' payrolls from Kansas 
State College Comptroller Office. 
nearby areas normally have made sizable purchases, and sales of 
their products, in Manhattan. The farm population of Riley 
county, which numbered 4,340 in 1945, had a total income of 
4)4,467,571, or an average of $3, 849 per family from the sale of 
their farm products for that year.25 
Of course, a major, if not the major, portion of the effec- 
tive demand was made by the "non-college, non-Ft. Riley, non- 
farm" city population -- the doctors, lawyers, merchants, and so 
on. 
Business Establishments in Manhattan 
Light Industry-. Facilities for the following types of 
contract work were available in Manhattan in 1950: welding, de- 
velopment of instruments and testing devices, meat processing, 
food freezing and storage, egg and poultry packing, job printing, 
building construction, and mill work. There were five agricul- 
ture processors, one poultry packing company, one livestock 
packer, three metal manufacturing firms, six construction ma- 
terials companies, two furniture makers, one serum plant (later 
destroyed in the 1951 flood), one monument company, and one ice 
plant in the immediate city area (but not all within the city 
limits). 26 The products which were manufactured or processed in 
1943 are listed in Table 6. 
2 5Department of Commerce, U. S. Census of Agriculture, 
Statistics for Counties, Vol. 1, Part 13, 197. 
20R. H. Breckenridge, 2n. cit., p. )111. 
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Table 6. Products manufactured or processed by Manhattan indus- 
tries, 1943.1 
Industry Product 
Agricultural 
Poultry packers 
Ice cream 
Butter 
Cheese 
Commercial feed 
Shell eggs 
Frozen eggs 
Dressed poultry 
Metal manufacturing Testing instruments 
Developmental work 
Neon and metal signs 
Farm elevators 
Feed grinders 
Electric motors 
Construction materials Sweeping compound 
Insulation 
Concrete blocks 
Building stock 
Cabinets 
Millwork 
Door and window screens 
Furniture Mattresses 
Upholstered furniture 
Awnings and seat covers 
Serum Hog cholera virus 
Anti-hog cholera serum 
1"The Industrial Questionnaire Survey of March, 191+3, 
Exhibit II, Appendix" (cited by R. H. Breckenridge, sm. cit., 
A.7) . 
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Retail Establishments. A total of 380 retail establishments 
accounted for an estimated 018 million sales in 1947 and $21 
million in 1948 (see Table 7 below). This evidently comprised 
the major portion of economic activity in Manhattan. 
Manhattan's Banking, Postal Saving, 
and Home Loan Trends 
Manhattan has for many years been served by the Union 
National Bank, The First National Bank, The Manhattan Building 
and Loan Association and the Home Building and Loan Association, 
the Federal Saving and Loan Association together with other 
smaller financial agencies. Table 8, below, illustrates develop- 
ments in commercial bank deposits and intra-city clearings and 
postal savings. With the figures reduced to an approximately 
"real" per capita basis, the secular trend for the average amounts 
of bank deposits has been clearly upward at an increasing rate 
over the period 1930-1951. The low figure, $134 per capita in 
July 1933, coincides with the depth of the depression and also 
shortly followed the March 1933 national banking moratorium. The 
slow increase in the middle and late thirties, followed by the 
rapid spurt in the war years, a decline in the immediate post- 
war period, and another increase in 1950 -- after Korea -- all 
reflected the general national pattern. The decline in 1951 was 
probably partially due to losses from the early spring floodings. 
However since the major flood occurred in July (the data were for 
the end of June) other factors were evidently of more importance. 
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Table 7. Retail outlet and estimated sales in Manhattan, 1946 
(and 1947).i 
Retail outlets : No. of stores 
: Sales in 
: thousands 
Apparel 
Automotive 
21 
(24) 
31 
(4o) 
$1,500 
(1,700) 
1,500 
(2,100) 
Drug stores 9 726 
(10) ( 850) 
Eating and drinking 36 600 
(45) (750) 
Filling Stations 40 750 
(42) (825) 
Furniture, household 10 _2 
12 _2 
Grocery 40 3,769 
(42) (4,250) 
Hardware, lumber, elec., etc. 21 500 
(21) (1,000) 
General Merchandise -2 3,122 
_2 (3,500) 
Total 380 18,292 
(425) (21,000) 
Source: Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, "Market Guide Survey" 
(Special and typewritten report for Manhattan Chamber of Commerce), 
194.8.2 
not available. 
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Table 8. Total deposits of Manhattan commercial bank, deposits 
per capita, "real" deposits per capita, total intra- 
city bank clearing, and total postal savings, 
selected years, 1920-1951. 
: Total 
Year: bank 
: deposits' 
:(thousands) 
Per : "Real" 
capitA : per ,: 
cap. dep.i: 
(dollars): (dollars) : 
Total 
intra-city 
bank 
clearings' 
(thousands) 
: Total 
: Postal 
Saving 
:(thousands) 
1920 
1930 
1931 
1932 13 
199334 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
$2,297 
2,492 
2,338 
1,696 
1,623 
2,073 
2,401 
2,873 
3,029 
2,965 
3,0 05 
3,362 
3,932 
4,517 
7,639 
9,239 
11,288 
13,980 
14,053 
14,416 
15,094 
17,116 
16,538 
$222 
192 
181 
140 
134 
163 
178 
207 
210 
20 
206 
265 
227 
471 
676 
688 
798 
745 17
7 
732 
897 
901 
$155 
161 
167 
145 
143 
170 
181 
209 
204 
203 
207 
252 
227 
268 
381 
538 
535 
572 
449 
43 
430 
3 
522 
483 
=IP 
11M11 
12,901 
14,047 
21,538 
27,947 
29,895 
30,017 
33,013 
32,825 
416 
609 
1,1818 
55 
1,162 
1,190 
1,183 
1,070 
917 
1From Dr. Raymond J. Doll, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City (letter of March 24, 1952); 1920-1933, deposits at and of 
July; 1934-1937, deposits at end of September; 1948-1951, 
deposits at end of June. 
.Divided by estimated "average total population," Table 4. 
Fromcolumn 
divided by B.L.S. consumers price index. 
47r  Mr. Alvin A. Hostetler, First National Bank, Manhattan, 
Kansas (earlier data lost in 1951 flood). 
SFrom Manhattan Post Office. 
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Total home loan resources in Manhattan were (in thousands): 
in 1929, $1,896; in 1941, $1,578; in 1945, $2,2101; and in 1948, 
$3,031.27 
Other Economic Indicators 
Labor. Labor unions have never been an important factor in 
Manhattan with the major exception of in the building trades; the 
musicians, postal clerks, and perhaps a few other occupations 
have also been unionized. According to a 1949 survey, wages for 
"skilled" labor ranged from 50 cents to $3.00 an hour, "semi- 
skilled," from 50 cents to $1.50, and "unskilled," from 30 cents 
to $1025 per hour. "The six firms indicating that labor turnover 
was high enough to be an important factor" paid an average of 
95.5 cents per hour to skilled labor, 89 cents to semi-skilled, 
and 73 cents to unskilled. 28 
Manhattan's population 14 years of age and older was 10,950 
in 1948 of which 8,230 were considered to be in the labor force. 
The total employed were 7,440. 29 
Transportation. Manhattan is located on U. S. Highways 40 
and 24 and Kansas Highways 29 and 13. It has three local air- 
ports: Manhattan Municipal, Potawatomie, and Man-Kan. It is on 
27Manhattan Chamber of Commerce, "Manhattan Statistics," 
(type4odata) 1949. Cf. Table 10 below. 
''11. H. Breckenridge, op. cit., p. 7. 
29Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Count Data 
Book, 1948. Cited in typed untitled report by Manhattan Chamber 
of Commerce. 
4o 
Table 9. Freight carloads forwarded and received, 19Y1. 
Union Pac. 
Rock Is. 
Union Pac. 
Rock Is. 
: Grain : Fruit : Poultry : Hay : Cattle: Other 
L2yleLaL_nrod. 
235 
71 5 72 
Carloads forwarded 
302 191 4 370 
121 69 
Carloads received 
Salt & 
Fruit Cattle can. goods Lumb. Mdse. Other 
36 163 35 365 671 
250 103 121 31 185 
Source: Manhattan Chamber of Commerce and the Manhattan 
City Commission, Brief in sung...I:b of the Establishment of Feeder 
Airline Service Between Wichita, Kansas, and Omaha, Nebraska, And 
Intermediate Points 19+5. 
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Table 10. Other economic indicators; building permits by number 
and valuation, postal receipts, and water consumption, 
selected years, 1880-1951. 
Year 
Building permits' Postal 
receipts 2 
(thousands) 
Water 
: consumption 3 
: (million gals.) 
: Reported 
: valuation 
: Total : 
: no. : 
: 
1880 $ - - $ 5 
1890 - - 8 
1900 - - 11 
1905 - - 14 
1910 - - 28 
1915 - - 39 
1920 - - 55 
1921 
1922 
275 
553 
- 
- 
* 
1923 741 - 
1924 602 - 
1925 
1926 
646 
391 
- 
- 
78 
* 
1927 239 
- 
* 
1928 278 - 86 
1929 293 - 90 
1930 296 - 89 
1931 153 - 85 428 
1932 85 - 79 409 
1933 33 35 82 418 
1934 
193 5 
18 
72 
34 
62 
85 
84 
48 
469 
3 
1936 71 59 87 545 
1937 
1938 
172 
276 
169 
161 
92 
93 
569 
617 
1939 359 277 101 667 
1940 26 177 108 656 
1941 377 261 122 626 
1942 45 86 134 615 
1943 42 99 141 6o4 
19001 37 go 155 678 
1945 10i2 290 158 621 
1946 710 300 166 716 
1947 860 426 174 73 
19 
148 
49 
843 
951 
69 3 
261 
194 
222 
720 
731 
1950 1,758 1,02 227 743 
1951 980 2022 218 710 
1 
,From official records of Manhattan City Clerk. 
2From official records of Manhattan Post Office. 
3From official records of Manhattan Water Department. 
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main lines of the Union Pacific and Rock Island which normally, 
in recent years, scheduled 11 freight and 10 passenger trains 
daily. Three bus lines and several scheduled and unscheduled 
freight trucking lines serve the city. The only transport pipe- 
line into Manhattan is used for natural gas. 
Miscellaneous Information. Various other information is 
offered in Tables 9 and 10, above. While not analyzing this data 
in detail, a few features should be pointed out. 
The most sensitive economic indicator obviously has been 
building permits. It showed an important building "boom" in the 
period 1922-1926 which gradually tapered in the late 'twenties -- 
until by 1934 reported building permit valuations constituted 
only about 2.5 percent of the previous high level year, 1923. A 
recovery was started in 1935 which was interrupted by the war 
shortages of 1942-1945. The extremely high figure of 1950 was 
partly caused by repair of hailstone damage; 861 permits were 
specifically for this purpose, amounting to $575,425. 
Postal services and water has had a much more inelastic 
demand. However even these indicators showed fluctuations, e.g., 
the decline in water consumption in 1933, which probably reflect 
the nationwide economic pressures. 
Conclusions on Manhattan's Economic Structure 
and General Economic Trends 
Manhattan since early in her history has had the character- 
istics of a "typical small midwest college town". Although she 
has developed some light industries, her economic activity has 
consisted largely of the retail marketing of goods manufactured 
and processed elsewhere. Her businessmen have catered especially 
to the students and faculty of the college, the nearby farm 
population, and to a certain extent, to the personnel from nearby 
Ft. Riely. 
Her general economic fluctuations have closely paralleled 
the broad national trends. Marked deviations from the national 
trends are (naturally) explainable in terms of local factors and 
occurrences. With this background we are now prepared to trace 
out in more meaningful terms specific trends in Manhattan's 
revenue sources. 
THE REVENUE HISTORY OF THE CITY OF MANHATTAN 
The original intention of this investigation was to estab- 
lish a complete history of the revenues of the City of Manhattan, 
if possible from its very beginnings as an incorporated second- 
class city in 1857. However, it was soon realized that due to 
the almost complete unavailability of monetary data for the 
period before the 1920's, such a task would have probably re- 
quired at the very least several months of intensive searching 
through and piecing together of the old and completely unorganized 
records (even the existence of most of which was no longer 
certain). Even revenue figures for the 1920's and early 1930's 
were extremely difficult to determine (as will be detailed below). 
As a result, it was felt that in the time available much more 
could be accomplished by concentrating the major portion of the 
investigation on the revenue history of the recent twenty year 
period, 1933-19527 using budget and "anticipated" estimates for 
the latter year. Since the history of Manhattan, similar to most 
history, has been dynlmic rather than static, and since the gener- 
al purpose of delving into the past is primarily for the dis- 
covery of "useful" knowledge which can be the partial basis for 
future policies, it appeared that the records of the past two 
decades would be of more value than that of all the 77 odd years 
preceding history. Nevertheless through the examining of old 
records, primarily the City Ordinances, the broad outlines of 
early revenue sources and trends has been roughly established. 
A General Outline of Manhattan's Pre-1933 
Revenue History 
The (unnumbered) City Ordinance of July 16, 1858 begins, 
For the support of the City Government, the payment of 
the city debts, and improvements of the City, and other 
expenses for each current year, there shall be assessed on 
all real and personal property within the limits of this 
City a tax not to exceed one half of one per centum annually, 
and also a Poll tax of one dollar 8n each male inhabitant 
over twenty-one years of age ... 3 
Thus at almost the very outset Manhattan's founders followed 
the established American local governmental tradition of reliance 
30Manhattan Ordinance Records, Book 1, Ord. No. -, July 16, 
1858, p. 2. 
upon the general property tax. (It can be fairly safely assumed 
that the poll tax was primarily designed as an effective means of 
disfranchising the "undesirable element," although this has not 
been definitely proven.) 
Other representative ordinances providing for revenue from 
various sources, down through the years, were: the authori- 
zation of "a special tax to aid in constructing a road to the 
gold regions "; 31 "The renting of the second floor of the school 
house to Temperance Societies @ 45.00 per quarter";32 granting 
"Ira Taylor a license to sell liquors ... Fifty Dollar fee";33 
establishing fines for "rapid riding of horses and leaving them 
unhitched on the streets, ... One Dollar to Fifty Dollars plus 
cost of suit";34 "for purpose of raising revenue for the year 
1866 and diminishing the number of dogs within said city ... a 
tax of Two Dollars is levied on each dog.";35 licenses required 
for "billiard table halls, Ten Dollars to Twenty-Five Dollars per 
year ... Auctioneer, Five to One Hundred Dollars per year, and ... 
Theatres ... amount named by Mayor";36 licenses for "draymen, 
wagoners, five to twenty dollars per year";37 licenses for 
"those selling ... sheriffs, assignees, bankrupt, fire or damaged 
31 , iolq., Ord. No. May 28, 1860, 77. 
32Ibid., Ord. No. -, February 251 1858, p. 47. 
3Ibid., Ord. No. July 30, 1866, p. 93. 
1-Ibid., Ord. No. July 21, 1866, p. 98. 
3 Ibid., Ord. No. -, July 23, 1866 p. 9)+. 
36Ibid., Ord. No. February 2, 1867, p. 112-114. 
37Manhattan Ordinance Records, Book 2, Ord. No. 22, Sep- 
tember 3, 1872, p. 33. 
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stock sales, or otherwise not taxed ... $20.00 per day"; 38 the 
authorizing of "Storm Sewer District Number 3 All of the tax- 
able property within ... shall be required to pay the cost and 
expense."39 "a special assessment ... for payments of sewer 
bonds apportioned to each tract, piece and parcel of land ... 
(the) tax to be collected in 10 annual installments 6% inter- 
est on unpaid balances"; 40 "a $3.00 Road Tax per year ... on all 
male persons ..."; 41 for "trees in the parkings, costs charged 
to abutting property according to front foot to be collected 
as other taxes" ;42 licenses on "Hucksters selling fruit, 
vegetables ... house to house or in standing trucks ... except 
those of on raising or city manufacture $5.00 per day plus 
$2.50 for each helper or $100 per year for each owner and $100 
per year for each helper"43 and, "special licenses on Bankrupt 
stocks $25.00 per day...1144 
On the basis of the data in the immediate post-1933 period 
it can be estimated that the property tax in the earlier period 
rarely failed to contribute less than 80 or 90 percent of the 
total municipal revenues -- as defined above, p. 7 -- and very 
likely in many years yielded an even greater proportion. 
381bid., Ord. No. 169, November 16, 1910, p. 374. 
39Ibid., Ord. No. 176, January 18, 1911, p. 386-387. 
+0Ibid., Ord. No. 192, June 27, 1911, p. 405. 
43-Manhattan Ordinance Records, Book 3, Ord. 237, May 22, 
19121,p. 43. 
;FdIbid., Ord. 397, April 11, 1922, p. 397. 
43Manhattan Ordinance Records, Book 5, Ord. No. 676, July 
26, 
1927, 183. 
Ibid., Ord. No. 1014, December 22, 1932, p. 351-352. 
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Licenses appeared to have been more for "regulative" purposes 
than designed to yield substantial amounts of revenue. 
The only state-shared revenue in this early period appeared 
to be that from the cigarette tax, beginning in 1927; the only 
regular "functional" state aid was the "state highway link 
maintenance" grant which started in 1925. 45 These two sources 
together likely averaged less than $4,000 a year in the late 
'twenties and early 'thirties. No evidence was found of federal 
grants to the City before 1933 -- in the depth of the depression 
and the first year of the New Deal. 
45 Research Department, Kansas State Chamber of Commerce, 
"Present Kansas Tax System, State and Local Taxes as of January 
1, 1952," (a one page chart). 
1+8 
Derivation of Revenue Data, 1933-1952 
As mentioned above, the greatest technical difficulty of this 
investigation was the obtaining of aggregate city revenue by 
revenue sources. 
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The figures for the different years, and some- 
times for the same year, were available in no one single record. 
Various sources had to be explored, and the revenue data, -- 
available only as "distributed" according to the various "expen- 
diture funds," -- "pulled out" and totaled. For example, in 1948 
revenue had been daily or monthly "distributed" to the following 
Funds: General Operating, Street, Fire, Park, Street Lighting, 
Noxious Weed, Municipal Band, U.S.O., Street Machinery, Bond and 
Interest, Emergency Warrant, Garbage, Cemetery, Public Auditor- 
ium, Memorial Building, Police Pension, Firemen Pension, and 
46 
Sources for the "distributed" revenue data were: for 
1933, Brelsford and Gifford Co. (Certified Public Accountants), 
"City of Manhattan, City Clerk, City Treasurer, Cash Receipts and 
Disbursements, January 1, 1921 to September 11, 1934" (no date of 
audit on report. This special audit was taken in connection with 
the case of the City vs. Charles H. Lantz, City Clerk from 1917- 
1934, on the charge of embezzlement of $67,523.21 over the period 
covered by the audit.); for 1934, Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, 
"City Budget for l936," August 1, 1935, p. 4.; for 1935, Brels- 
ford and Gifford Co., "City of Manhattan, Kansas, Report on 
Accounts, December 31, 1935"; for 1936, "City Budget for 1938" 
(special broadsheet printing); for 1937 through 1946, City Clerk, 
"Summary of Expenditures and Revenues by Funds" (mimeographed); 
1947; for 1947, "City Budget for 1949," 1948; for 1948, "City 
Budget for 1950," 1949; for 1949, "City Budget for 1951," 1950; 
1950, "City Budget for 1952," 1951; for 1951, from the City 
Clerk's Cash Receipts Ledger; for 1952, as noted below, p. 49. 
In a few cases items classified as "miscellaneous" in City 
Budgets and the special summary covering 1937-1946 were found 
"broken down" to specific revenue sources in the annual C.P.A. 
reports which have been taken every year since 1935. In such 
cases the revenue was included under the specific source. 
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Library. Each of these funds had received revenues from different 
sources. The "arithmetic" involved in totaling, and cross-check- 
ing totals was considerable -- not even a "control" figure for the 
total yearly revenue from all sources was available. All figures 
derived were actual revenues received with two general exceptions: 
(a) 1952 estimates, which were taken from either the City Budget 
for 1952 or from the "anticipated revenue" column in the "City 
of Manhattan Financial Report as of March 31, 1952," and in two 
cases, i.e., federal grants-in-aid and "miscellaneous" revenue, 
the estimates of the writer; (b) For the years 1933-1941, the 
estimates of the writer for the value of federal benefits, large- 
ly in the form of labor services, from federal "depression- 
emergency" agencies (see Table 17 below). The basis for these 
estimates will be detailed below. 
Manhattan's Recent Aggregate Revenue Trends 
Quite obviously, specific increases in expenditure have been 
the major determinant of Manhattan's revenue history. However, 
since this investigation has not dealt with the detail of City 
expenditures, the causes of trends and fluctuations will be indi- 
cated in more general and perhaps more "basic" terms. (It might 
be suggested that such a detailed revenue-expenditure comparison 
would offer ample material for some future investigation -- by 
another student.) 
As might have been expected in view of Manhattan's popu- 
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lation growth over the past two decades and the nationwide in- 
flation during most of the same period, the trend of aggregate 
dollar revenue for the City has been almost continually on the 
uprise, from the approximate amount, $209,166 in 1933 to $486,951 
in 1950, and an estimated $788,615 in 1952. As indicated in 
Table 11 below, the yearly data are somewhat erratic throughout 
the period, especially in 1933-1934, 1939, and 1947-1952. The 
first of these two periods of major fluctuation was largely due 
to the substantial "injections" of aid from federal agencies. 
The latter is mostly the result of post-war inflation and federal 
grants-in-aid for the specific function of repairing flood 
damage in Manhattan. 
In order to eliminate the "known factors," (a) population 
growth and decline, and (b) changes in the value of the dollar 
during the twenty year span, the aggregate dollar revenues were 
reduced to "dollar revenue per capita" and to "real revenue per 
capita" (see Table 11 below). It was recognized that the use of 
estimated population data reduced the "absolute validity" of the 
resulting figures; but none the less it was felt that a more 
meaningful, realistic picture resulted. Similarly, the reduction 
to "real revenue per capita" was not felt to determine the ulti- 
mate story, but it was felt that it did reveal a certain extreme- 
ly important development -- a remarkable decline in "real" aggre- 
gate revenue per capita in the period 1942-1949 as compared with 
the previous nine years. 
During the war years this trend seemed to be primarily 
Table 11. Total revenues of the City of Manhattan, yearly dif- 
ferences, rates of change, revenues per capita, and 
"real" revenues per capita, 1933-1952. 
Year : Total 
: revenues 
1 
: 
Yearly 
: differences 
: (X $) 
: 
: 
: 
: 
. 
Rates 
of 
change 
(X %) 
: "Current'': "Real $" 
: revenue : revenue, 
: per cap.?: per cap.-) 
: : 
1933 $209,166* $17.26 $18.68 
1934 299,081* X 89,915 X 43.0 23.56 24.62 
1935 251,111* - 47,970 - 16.0 18.57 18.93 
1936 263,498* X 12,387 X 4.9 19.01 19.18 
1937 246,350* - 17,148 - 6.5 17.08 16.63 
1938 258,856* X 12,506 X 5.1 17.89 17.75 
1939 330,537* X 71,681 / 27.7 22.71 22.85 
1940 254,772* - 75,765 - 22.9 17.23 17.20 
1941 260,312* X 5,540 X 2.2 17.53 16.66 
1942 267,000 X 6,688 X 2.6 18.)01- 15.83 
1943 257,563 - 9,437 - 3.3 15.87 12.84 
1944 238,336 - 19,227 - 7.5 17.44 13.90 
1945 259,046 X 20,710 / 8.0 15.79 12.30 
1946 259,463 X 417 X .2 14.81 10.62 
1947 313,006 X 53,543 / 20.6 15.98 10.01 
1948 423,345 X 110,339 X 35.2 21.89 12.73 
1949 408,677 - 14,668 - 3.5 19.82 11.65 
1950 486,951 X 78,274 X 19.1 25.53 14.85 
1951 705,784 7' 218,833 X 44.9 38.47 20.62 
1952 788,615* X 82,831 X 11.7 44.18 23.30 
1 The aggregate of revenues from all sources, see note 46 
above. 
2First column divided by estimated "average total population" 
from Table 4, above. 
3Fourth column .divided by B.L.S. consumer price index (for 
1951 the September index was used, for 1952, the April index). 
*Includes estimated data, see note 46 above and Table 17 
below. 
explainable in the decline in municipal expenditures (See Table 
20 below) which in turn was due to shortages and federal control 
of material and manpower for construction projects and a resulting 
decline in the demand for revenue. Revenue declined especially 
from federal depression emergency agencies coming to an end in 
1942 (see Table 17 below). Property tax revenue also declined, 
but not substantially (see Table 12 below). The other sources 
generally remained at previous levels or actually increased (see 
Tables 14, 15, and 16). But in the immediate post-war years, 
1946-1949, when the City expenditures rose sharply, the "real 
revenue per capita" dropped even below the war years, at a time 
when the City debt increased rapidly (see Table 20, below) 
"Dollar" revenue per capita for 1946 was only $14.81, or over 34 
percent below that of 1939; "real" revenue per capita for the 
same year was but $10.62 or only 53 percent of the "real" per 
capita revenue of 1939. This situation lax be primarily explained 
by two factors. First, the "estimated total population" increase 
of 2,967 between the two years, 1939 to 1946, was largely due to 
the rapidly expanding enrollment at Kansas State College, only 
934 of the increase was by the "permanent" population (see Table 
4 above). Now if it is assumed that the students required, and 
received, less municipal services than the permanent citizens, 
which is not too illogical, although not proven by empirical 
evidence, the demand for revenue per capita would decline as the 
proportion of students to the "average total population" increas- 
ed. The second factor was the general reluctance of American 
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Table 12. Manhattan's revenue from property taxes, "ad valorem," 
intangible, "back tax," and total property taxes, and 
total property tax revenue/total City revenues, 
1933-1952.1 
: Ad valorem : Intang. 
Year tax : tax 
: revenue 2 : revenue 
: Back Total 
: tax : property 
: revenue3 : tax 
revenue 
: Total prop. 
: tax. rev. 
: as % of 
: total rev. 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
143 
19944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
19 51 , 
1952***0 
$164,786 
199,566 
155,80o 
167,946 
153,269 
157,298 
150,176 
140,758 
148,159 
157,833 
151,677 
156,657 
149,422 
128,414 
160,317 
246,308 
226,529 
255,287 
274,454 
359,976 
$ ** 
** 
** 
1,556 
2,085 
2,267 
2,501 
2,288 
2,367, 
1272 
2,738, 
103, 
41 
3,74 
4500 
4,566 
7,237 
7,302 
8,029 
3,132 
8,113 
$ ** 
** 
26,182 
19,138 
12,885 
10,385 
10,815 
12,592 
186;15 27 
,00 
5,200 
8,882 
3 
3,,663 085
4,029 
4,759 
3,065 
2,921 
4,722 
1,34o 
$164,786 
199,566 
181,982 
188,640 
168,239 
169,950 
163,492 
155,638 
166,653 
166,1+60 
159,615 
165,642 
156,659 
135,899 
168,912 
25813o4 
236,896 
266,237 
282,308 
369,429 
6b.7 
72.47* 
71.59* 
68.29* 
65.65* 
49.46* 
61.09* 
64.o2* 
62.34 
61.97 
69.50 
6o.48 
52.38 
53.96 
61.02 
57.97 
5+.67 
40.00 
46.85 
'See footnote 46 for sources of data. 
'Includes all current revenue from the general property tax 
except that on intangible personal property. 
3Delinquent property taxes, may have included very small 
amounts of other delinquent local taxes. 
"I'Fourth column divided by fourth column of Table 11 above. 
SThese figures may be erroneous, some revenue included as 
ad valorem 
could be from the intangible tax. 
°All estimates. 
*Include estimated federal grants-in-aid. 
**Data evidently included as ad valorem, i.e.; not kept in 
separate accounts. 
***Estimates. 
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municipalities to increase taxes proportionally to the increase 
in the "cost of city living". 
As thus "explained" the sharp drop in "real" municipal 
revenue per capita would appear to be a temporary rather than a 
long-run tendency. The sharp increase in this "time-series" in 
1950, 1951, and expected 1952 is not entirely explainable by the 
emergency revenues required to repair flood damage (which was of 
course in 1951). That is, a more long term shift back to in- 
creased real revenue per capita may have started in 1950, or even 
a year or so earlier. This may have been due to changes in the 
two factors mentioned above. First, since 1948 College enrollment 
began to fall off rapidly. Therefore the share of the remaining 
"average citizen" of the increasing city expenditures would in- 
crease -- assuming that city expenditures were not greatly affect- 
ed by the size of the student body. Second, the willingness of 
those in charge of revenue policy to take measures to increase 
aggregate revenues, even before the 1951 flood, appears to have 
been evidenced by the 35.2 percent increase in aggregate revenues 
in 1948 (over the previous year) and the 19.1 percent increase in 
1950. 47 
The individual trends in the component parts of aggregate 
Manhattan revenues will next be analyzed by general groups of 
sources and by individual sources. 
47 
It is difficult to determine what revenues in 1951 and 
1952 would have been had the flood not occurred; in 1951 the 
$106,879 federal flood grant accounted for only 49 percent of the 
$218,833 net increase over 1950. 
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The Property Tax in Manhattan48 
The property tax has, in the post-1932 era, varied from 
78.78 percent of the (estimated) aggregate revenues in 1933 to 
40.00 percent of the (actual) aggregate revenues in 1951. The 
trend of its relative importance as a revenue source has been un- 
disputedly downward. In terms of aggregate dollar yields, this 
source was fairly stable in the depression years, 1933-1940, 
ranging between $200,000 and $155,000, gradually declining, in 
these years. Its aggregate yields continued to decline during 
the war years to a low for the decades of $135,899 in 1946. 
Starting in 1947, its dollar yields began to increase to an ex- 
pected high figure of $359,976 in 1952. The reason for its 
dollar increase, but relative (to total revenue) decline is "ob- 
viously" because aggregate dollar revenues from all sources have 
greatly increased, and that the relative importance of other 
sources has increased. 
Theoretical, technical, and administrative details of the 
property tax in Manhattan, e.g., the procedure of assessment and 
collection by Riley county as an agent for the City, will not be 
discussed in detail. However some features of the component 
parts of the total property tax revenue, i.e., that from (a) the 
"ad valorem" tax, which has included levies on real estate, land 
and improvements, as well as on tangible personal property, 
48 All revenue data under this heading are in Table 12, q.v., 
or derived therefrom. 
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(b) the "intangible" tax on stocks, notes, bonds, etc., and (c) 
delinquent ("back") tax revenue, will be mentioned: 
From the evidence it was clear that of the two primary 
property tax sources, ad valorem and intangible, the former has 
been overwhelmingly the more important. For example, in 1936 the 
latter comprised less than one percent of total property tax 
revenue, and in 1950 only a little over three percent. Revenue 
from delinquent taxes declined sharply from $26,182 in 1935 to 
$2,921 in 1950. 
(Delinquent taxes have long been regarded as a sensitive 
"danger signal" by tax administrators. When tax delinquency in- 
creased, it was due, obviously, to inability or unwillingness to 
pay, or both. In any case, more often than not, the city govern- 
ment has been subject to political pressures to ease the burden. 
In recent decades, especially in the depression of the 1930's, 
such delinquencies were serious nationwide phenomena -- reflect- 
ing the general economic depression. While delinquent tax revenue 
has not been as sensitive an "indicator" as the delinquencies 
themselves, due to the time lag between the inability or unwill- 
ingness to pay until the taxpayers are actually able or willing 
to pay the overdue taxes, in the absence of delinquency data over 
the twenty year span, they have appeared to be a "good substitute." 
The actual delinquent revenue data for Manhattan (Table 12, above) 
reflects the nationwide business cycles quite clearly -- allowing 
for the time lag just mentioned. In addition, the influence of 
one local occurrence, the severe hailstorm of 1950, might very 
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well have accounted for the sharp increase of the 1951 figure, 
$4,722, over the 1950 figure of $2,921. On the other hand, the 
disastrous flood of 1951 should have, theoretically at least, 
reduced the ability-to-pay in that year, and lead to delinquen- 
cies and an (expected) increase in 1952 instead of an expected 
decrease to $1,340. The explanation of this "contradiction" may 
be: (a) that the actual ability-to-pay was not seriously affect- 
ed by the flood and/or (b) that the 1952 figure is an under- 
estimation and (c) that the amounts in the recent boom years are 
so small that the noted fluctuations are really insignificant, 
i.e. due to random factors.) 
The data in Table 13, below, indicate the "tangible," in- 
cluding real estate as well as tangible personal property, and 
intangible personal property assessed valuations for the two 
decade period. Although the total valuations in the early 1950's 
were about double those of the late 1930's and early 1940's, 
reflecting the increased building construction and improvements 
of recent years, as well as the general price inflation, it has 
been evident that gross underestimations of the real market values 
have occurred throughout the entire period -- as in almost every 
American city. It is generally admitted that in Kansas the 
assessments have in recent years averaged only about 25 percent of 
the market values -- in spite of the Kansas statute requiring 
"true valuation". (Cf. the estimations of flood loss, totaling 
$22.5 million. Obviously, since the great bulk of the portion of 
Manhattan that was inundated was "saved" and retained considerable 
Table 13. "Tangible," intangible, and total property value 
assessments in Manhattan, 1943-1952. 
Year 
: "Tangible" 
: property 
: valuations 1 
. 
. 
: Intangible 
: property 
: valuations' 
. 
. 
: 
: Total 
: 
. 
. 
1932 $12,673 $1,308 $13,981 
1933 11,908 882 12,790 
1934 9,966 841 10,807 
1935 10,237 921 11,158 
1936 10,189 899 11,088 
1937 10,025 1,384 11,409 
1938 10,277 1,394 11,671 
1939 10,441 1,533 11,974 
1940 10,530 1,316 11,846 
1941 10,762 11)001 12,206 
1942 11,080 1,655 12,735 
1943 11,883 1,667 13,550 
1944 11,640 2l004 13,644 
1945 11,740 2,150 13,890 
1946 11,793 2,654 14,447 
1947 12,441 3,467 15,908 
1948 141044 4,281 18,325 
1949 14,850 4,385 19,235 
1950 16,543 4,835 21,378 
1951 18,610 4,553 23,163 
1952 19,671 4,868 24,539 
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'From records of Manhattan City Clerk (includes real 
property.) 
2Ibid. 
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economic value, some "slight" misvaluations seem to have occurred. 
As might be deduced by a comparison of property tax revenues 
in Table 12 with the property valuations of Table 13, the property 
tax levy was fairly stable in the period 1933-1947. During this 
period total property tax revenues ranged from a low of $135,899 
in 1946 to a high of $199,566 in 1934, and the tax levies, in 
mills, ranged from 11.10 in 1946 to 16.53 in 1937 -- the mode 
being a little over 13 mills. Since 1948, when a high for the 
twenty years (1933-1952) of 17.9393 was levied, the rates have 
been higher than the 1933-1947 period. In 1951 it dropped to 
15.1780 mills; in 1952 it was 17.5188. 
Statutory limitations have long been a ceiling to the maxi- 
mum expansion of property tax revenues in Kansas. For example, 
second-class cities in the state, including Manhattan, can only 
levy 11 mills for "general operating purposes," 2 mills for 
libraries, 5 mills for street lighting, 5 mills for "water," .5 
mill for airport construction and maintenance, etc. In addition 
there is a total limitation of 12 mills for all purposes except 
bond retirement (for which from 4 to over 8 mills were levied in 
Manhattan since 1932), and a few minor exceptions. 49 This ex- 
ception has been an important one for some American cities; i.e., 
current expenses have been met by issuing bonds. The bonds have 
been promptly retired by increasing the bond tax levy. 
However, in Manhattan, as throughout most of the country, 
1952. 
"Supplement to General Statutes 2f Kansas 1949, 1951, 79- 
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with some important exceptions, the primary reason for the de- 
clining importance of property taxes has not been these limi- 
tations. 50 Instead other factors, especially as brought to bear 
in the form of political protests and dissatisfaction, have 
forced the search for new revenue sources to be intensified. 
Manhattan's Other Local Tax Revenue51 
Under her taxing power the City of Manhattan has levied the 
following, in addition to the property tax: special assessments; 
franchise taxes; many types of business and trade licenses; 
building and "other" permits; and the dog tax. Taken as a group 
for the period 1933-1951 these sources' contributions varied from 
$8,030, or 3.84 percent of the total from all sources, in 1933 to 
$76,317, or 10.81 percent of the total in 1951. The total dollar 
yields, as well as the proportion to aggregate revenues, from 
these taxes have fluctuated considerably throughout the entire 
period, e.g., it rose to 9.58 percent of total revenues in 1936; 
two years later in 1939 it dropped back to 5.56 percent. From 
19)0i through 1949 the revenue from this group of taxes remained 
an almost constant proportion of total revenues. In the three 
years, 1950-1952 it increased to average around 10 percent of 
total revenues; this was largely explained by the increased 
50 An opinion expressed by City Manager Avery in an interview 
of J1474 3, 1952. 
-1411 revenue data under this heading are in Table 14, q.v., 
or derived therefrom. 
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revenue in these recent years from the two most important taxes 
in this category, special assessment and franchise taxes. 
Special Assessment Revenue. Since early in its history the 
City has used special assessments to finance certain types of 
municipal improvements which, supposedly, benefited certain of 
her citizens more than the others: street and alley construction 
and surfacing, sidewalk construction, the laying of sewers and 
storm sewers, and in a few cases, the planting of trees in park- 
ings. The normal procedure has been as follows: (a) the cost of 
the project has been determined and, usually, a contract given to 
a private construction company; (b) bonds have been issued to 
meet the immediate cost; (c) this cost has then been divided among 
the "beneficiaries" on a front footage basis, or in some cases 
according to the assessed value of the real property benefited; 
(d) the assessment is payable in five, or usually, ten yearly 
installments with the regular yearly property taxes. In a few 
cases when the "cost was too much for one area to bear" the 
assessment has been levied on all real property throughout the 
city. 
Over most of the period covered, i.e., until 1950, the 
revenue collected from this source varied from apparently none in 
1933 and 1935 to a high of $11,649 in 1936. As noted above, 
since 1950 special assessments became of more importance, yield- 
ing $36,395 in 1951. 
Franchise Tax Revenue. This tax levied against the Kansas 
Power and Light Company and the Southwestern Bell Telephone 
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Table 14. Manhattan's local tax revenue (other than from proper- 
ty taxes): special assessment, license, permit, and 
dog tax revenue; total from group; and total / total 
City revenues, 1933-1952.1 
Year: Special:Franchise:License :Permit : Dog : Total : 
: assess.: tax :revenue : rev. : tax 
: revenue: revenue : : rev. : : 
Total as 
percent 
of total 
revenues 
1933 $ ** $ 6,382 $ 615 $ 416 $ 416 $ 8,030 3.84* 
1934 10,187 6,264 928 902 1,202 19,483 6.51* 
1935 ** 7,367 2,044 713 1,316 11,440 4.56* 
1936 11,649 7,912 3,738 803 1,140 25,242 9.58* 
1937 10,292 8,201 2,750 135 1,393 22,771 9.24* 
1938 6,370 8,108 2,061 181 1,360 18,080 6.98* 
1939 6,336 8,217 2,224 101 1,551 18,372 5.56* 
1940 6,210 9,476 2,513 165 707 19,071 7.49* 
1941 2,946 9,237 2,208 602 1,382 16,375 6.29* 
1942 2,937 1,797 334 1,753 16,665 6.24 918)01 
1943 10,250 10,735 3,898 389 1,748 27,020 10.49 
1944 3,596 11,411 2,571 247 1,968 19,793 8.30 
1945 3,380 10,827 2,676 943 1,432 19,258 7.43 
1946 3,512 9,610 4,314 1,233 892 19,561 7.54 
1947 2,802 11,113 6,876 1,537 1,084 23,412 7.48 
1948 6,195 13,461 7,923 1,998 2,129 31,706 7.49 
1949 8,413 10,001 9,946 1,8132 2,081 32,897 8.05 
1950 27,970 10,503 10,264 2,689 1,282 52,708 10.82 
1951 36,395 26,191 10,569 1,627 1,537 76,317 10.81 
19523 35,000 28,000 10,000 2,500 1,700 77,200 9.79 
1For detailed explanation of derivation of data see p. 48- 
49 aboye, especially footnote 46. 
Includes some "rents." 
3Estimates. 
* Total revenues included an estimate of federal aid. 
**Evidently either none or included in "Other and misc." 
revenue, see Table 15 below. 
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Company for use of the city streets and alleys has been based 
upon gross company revenues in Manhattan. It has been the most 
stable important revenue source for the City for the years 1933- 
1950. Its growing yield from $6,382 in 1933 to 10,503 in 1950 
was apparently caused more by population growth more than any 
other single factor. A new contract at increased rates, which 
was negotiated with the power and light company, went into effect 
in 1951 and thus accounted for most of the increase to $26,191 or 
3.7 percent of total revenues, in 1951 and (an expected) $28,000 
in 1952. 
License Revenue. This revenue source of only minor im- 
portance in the early 1930's has grown in recent years to a fari- 
ly sizable source of income, e.g., in 1951 it produced some 
$10,569 or 1.5 percent of the total revenues of the City. The 
main reasons for the impressive gains of the 1945-1951 years have 
been: (a) increased enforcement of existing license requirements; 
(b) an increased "base" of old license requirements, e.g., more 
"pinball" machines, "jukeboxes", and other amusement devices 
(probably due to increased student enrollment); (c) increase in 
the rate of some licenses; and (d) some new licenses, e.g., the 
$300 license on retail liquor establishments. 
Permit Revenue. This very minor revenue source comes pri- 
marily from the issuance of building permits (cf. the data on 
building permits valuation and number, Table 10 above). In the 
year of its greatest dollar yield, $2,689 in 1950 (the year of a 
serious hailstorm which did much damage to Manhattan property) it 
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amounted to only .55 percent of total City revenues. 
122g, Tax Revenue. In dollar receipts, this has been another 
of the most stable, although minor, source of municipal revenue, 
rarely yielding much less than '1,000 or much over $2,000 a year. 
However, due to the factors of increasing population, increasing 
inflation, and increasing revenue from other sources, the $1,316 
collected in 1935 represented .52 percent of the total year's 
collections, while the almost equivalent amount collected in 1950, 
$1,282, represented only .26 percent of the revenues of this 
later year (or exactly half the former proportion). 
Manhattan's (Local) Non-Tax Revenue52 
The various City administered non-tax revenue sources have, 
as a group, gradually increased in importance both absolutely and 
relatively. Yielding $10,295, or only 4.9 percent of total 
revenues in 1933, these sources yielded 25.88 percent of total 
revenues in 1948 and $113,695 of the $705,784 total revenues 
from all sources in 1951. This group of non-tax sources for most 
years accounted for more than twice the amount that local non- 
property taxes produced. 
Fines and Fees. From a total of $416 "credited" to this 
account in 1933 -- primarily from police court fines but including 
charges for a few other specific City services -- this revenue 
52 All revenue data under this heading are in Table 16, q.v., 
or derived therefrom. 
Table 15. Manhattants local non-tax revenue by sources, total of this group, and total / total city revenues, 1933-1952.1 
year 
: Fines 
& fees 
: rev. 
: Airport : 
rev, : 
Park. : Swim. 
meter : pool 
rev. rev. 
:Cem. lots : Garb. : Trans. : Count. : 
: & serv. : sold : from : fire 
: rev. . rev-. : Water : call 
: INp.. : rev. 
: Gas test : 
: rev. 
"Other & : 
misc." : 
rev. 
Total : Total as 
local : percent 
non-tax : of all 
: rev. : revenues 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
19y1 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952* 
$ 416 
645 
1,316 
3,537 
2,039 
2,278 
2,138 
2,293 
5,508 
7,865 
5,332 
5,814 
7,366 
7,702 
11,425 
14,489 
8,591 
11,237 
12,521 
11,500 
911 
2,204 
2,157 
2,469 
2,949 
1,623 
3,329 
3,017 
1,761 
1,986 
870 
1,452 
1,000 
14 
2,828 
19,460 
21,444 
27,263 
27,522 
18,050 
27,000 
ONO 
5,772 
4,475 
5,575 
7,003 
9,111 
11,121 
10,223 
8,634 
10,893 
9,792 
8,635 
9,458 
10,313 
10,000 
$ 1,461 
1,404 
4,301 
6,292 
71401 
7,603 
6,146 
5,245 
8,009 
9,707 
13,163 
12,953 
10,784 
13,104 
16,790 
13,824 
15,943 
13,565 
12,322 
9,500 
$ 931 
500 
1,031 
1066 
1;538 
1,688 
2;015 
1,410 
1,785 
1,690 
1,365 
4349 
1,689 
1,749 
776 
1,772 
1,887 
1,838 
1,523 
2,200 
$ ** 
** 
9,412 
11,073 
9,070 
8,356 
19,991 
14,112 
8,881 
10,314 
6,758 
6,675 
6,600 
16,510 
7,395 
6,330 
13,533 
22,730 
6,335 
22,385 
$ ** 
** 
116 
** 
278 
159 
352 
123 
409 
267 
120 
141 
198 
330 
** 
** 
** 
** 
149 
** 
$ ** 
** 
183 
** 
329 
756 
88 
88 
72 
8o 
96 
104 
88 
96 
104 
72 
88 
104 
24 
** 
$ 7,4872 
21+,1+273 
5,776 
2,241 
3,627 
7,299 
2,574, 
6,260) 
20,475 
1,594 
3,148 
21404 
5,583 
11,1506 
23,4337, 
14,2512 
15,7969 
51,0061k, 
36,62011 
$10,295 
26,976 
22,135 
22,246 
22,896 
24,467 
43,801 
31,231 
38,803 
59,558 
40,008 
44,254 
40,989 
59,865 
81,010 
92,917 
92,177 
103,120 
113,695 
120,205 
9.02* 
8.81* 
8.44* 
9.29* 
9.45* 
13.25* 
12.26* 
14.91* 
22.31 
15.53 
18.57 
15.82 
23.07 
25.88 
21.95 
22.55 
21.18 
16.11 
15.25 
'For detailed explanation of derivation of data see above, especially footnote 41. 
2Probably includes some cigarette tax revenue and perhaps some special assessment revenue. 
May include a sizable transfer from the Water Depto 
4Probably includes some cigarette tax revenue. 
5Includes $879, rent of municipal property. 
6Includes $3,790 rent of municipal property. 
7lncludes '*-7658 transfer from "Street Fund," $1,750 from sale of obsolete street equipment, and $4,557 from "rentals and misc." 
8lncludes $4,224 from municipal building rent, $2,789 from "park rental and concessions," and $1,116 from police and firemen salary deductions 
for pension funds. 
,9Includes $2,360 from "reimbursed expenses,"$3,319 from municipal, building rent, and $2,054 from pension deductions. 
-L°Includes $4,055 from municipal building rent, $28,752 from temporary housing provided by city, and $2,348 from pension deductions. 
11my own estimate due to the conflict between "the City Budget for 1952" and "Financial Report as of March 31, 1952" (probably a minimum 
figure). 
*Total revenues included an estimate of federal aid. 
**Probably included in "Other and misc." revenue. 
source yielded 12,521 in 1951 or over thirty times the earlier 
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tigure. It was interesting to note that in regular election 
years, i.e., in the even-numbered years, not including the esti- 
mate for 1952, revenue from fines and fees exceeded both the pre- 
ceding, and succeeding (non-election) year in the year 1936, 1938, 
1942, and 1948. The revenue in the other election years, i.e., 
in 1934, 1940, 19)0i, and 1950, exceeded the previous year, but 
was less than the following year. With this meager evidence it 
is not suggested that the ordinances of Manhattan are enforced 
more strongly in election than in non-election years, but it 
would seem to lend some support to that popular notion. (Of 
course, the data included uncertain amounts of non-police fine 
revenue, which would weaken the case for this belief.) Perhaps 
an important reason for the 1947-1948 increase, followed by the 
decline of 1949, was the change of police court policy for park- 
ing violations. The penalty in 1947-1948 was a one dollar mini- 
mum fine, in 1949 this was reduced to a nominal five cents. 
Airport revenue. The municipal airport, beginning in 1940 
yielded minor amounts of revenue primarily from the sale of hay 
and alfalfa grown around the landing strips. The year of the 
greatest yield was 1946 when $3,329 was received. 
Parking Meter Revenue. Judging from the total revenue of 
fourteen dollars received from this source -- which had its 
statutory authorization under the police power of the City -- 
parking meters were only just being installed in 1945. The rapid 
increase in revenue in the first three or four years had leveled 
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off in 1949 at $27,263, or an important 12.0 percent of total 
revenues, apparently at the "saturation point" of the available 
metered parking areas. The 1951 inundation accounted for the 
sharp drop in revenue in that year. During the first several 
years 50 percent of the revenue had been used in payment for the 
meters -- which however would appear to be more in the nature of 
a profitable investment, rather than the incurring of a "cost." 
Swimming Pool Revenue. Since their completion in 1939 the 
two municipal swimming pools (separate units for the "whites" and 
the "blacks") have yielded from a low revenue of $4,475 in 1940 
to a high for the period covered of $11,121 in 1944 -- the year 
of the greatest expansion of the number of Fort Riley personnel 
(who have always greatly patronized the pools). Since its open- 
ing the so-called "net revenue", i.e., in monetary terms after de- 
ductions of direct expenses, has averaged around 2,000 a year. 
Cemetery Lots and Services. This source of municipal 
revenue like most local non-tax revenues has presumably been jus- 
tified by the "benefit principle." In 1934, a year of 174 deaths 
in Manhattan this revenue totaled $1,404; in 1949, with 201 
deaths it totaled $15,943 (see Table 5 above). (Apparently it has 
not only the cost of living that has been going up). The bulk of 
these receipts have been used for beautifying the cemetary grounds 
and meeting other expenses, not for general government expense. 
Garbage Sales, Country Fire Calls, and "Gas Tests." 
"Country fire calls" are the use of Manhattan fire fighting equip- 
ment with the neighboring rural areas, as well as with Kansas 
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State College. "Gas tests" are the tests of the B.T.U. content 
of the natural gas supplied by the power and light company; the 
expense is borne by the company. These three sources together 
account for very minor amounts of revenue, e.g., only a total of 
$1,523 in 1951 or .22 percent of total revenues. Individually, 
and therefore in the aggregate, they yielded almost constant 
dollar amounts throughout most of the twenty year period. 
Transfers from the City. Water Department. This municipal 
enterprise has throughout practically all of the twenty year span 
yielded generally important, although fluctuating amounts of 
revenue for general governmental expenditure (although technical- 
ly the transfers have been into the Bond and Interest Fund, the 
net result has been the same). For example, the $19,991 transfer 
of 1937 represented over 8.1 percent of the total revenues; ten 
years later the 1947 transfer of $7,395 made up less than 2.4 
percent of total revenues. The largest transfer in the period, 
the $22,730 of 1950 was less than 4.7 percent of that year's 
receipts due to increasing inflation, expenditure and the rapid 
increase of other revenue sources. 
Other and Miscellaneous Revenue. This City bookkeeping 
account was one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the investi- 
gation; for several years the amounts included in this account 
were far too large for so-called "minor" revenue sources. For 
the period before 1943 the Cash Receipts Ledgers, which contained 
more detail than the published Budgets and in many cases than the 
audit reports, had been "filed" so thoroughly that they could not 
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be located. It was felt that part of the "other and misc." 
amounts, especially in the years 1933, 1934, 1935, 1939, and 1942 
very likely contained revenue which should have been included in 
the sources specified above or to be discussed below. (Of course, 
this may or may not have been the case in all years.) For the 
years 1947-1951 this item, while large, was partially explain- 
able, see the footnotes of Table 15 above. The new accounting 
system starting January 1, 1952 has corrected this situation by 
the splitting of this "catch-all" account into many specific 
revenue accounts. 
As the result of the above, and perhaps also due to the 
genuinely "random" occurrence of "really miscellaneous" revenue, 
the trend of this source was extremely unstable, e.g., it was 
$24,427 or over 8.1 percent of total revenues in 1934, $278 or 
.11 percent of the total in 1936, and $51,006 or 7.2 percent of 
the total revenues in 1951. If properly distributed some of this 
revenue would perhaps "smooth out" some of the unevenness of the 
other specific sources. 
Manhattan's State-Shared Revenues53 
The taxes in this category, i.e., the retailers' sales tax, 
the cigarette tax, the liquor enforcement tax, and the "one-cent 
gasoline tax" are all levied by the State of Kansas. The revenues 
53 A1l revenue data under this heading are in Table 16, q.v., 
or derived therefrom, except as noted. 
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therefrom are shared with her local units on differing bases. As 
a revenue source for the City of Manhattan -- taken as a group -- 
they have had the most rapid growth of any of the major cate- 
gories of revenue from an insignificant status in the early 
'thirties. For example, in 1934 they amounted to .23 percent of 
her total revenues, until by 1950 they represented only slightly 
under one dollar in eight of total municipal revenues. This was 
larger than the proportion received from all local taxes other 
than property taxes; for a few years, 1945-1947, it had about 
twice the yield of the latter group. In 1946, it represented its 
largest proportion of total revenue for the two decade period 
covered -- 16.71 percent. Since that date its relative impor- 
tance has somewhat declined, e.g., to 10.93 percent of the total 
in 1951 -- in which flood year, however, it had its greatest ab- 
solute dollar yield, $77,130. The estimated decline, in 1952, 
to $54,781, or 6.94 percent of total expected revenues may be an 
underestimation. 
Cigarette Tax Revenue. This tax (originally adopted in 
1927) was the first of the State of Kansas which was regularly 
shared with her local units. For the period of 1933-1940 it 
yielded only small amounts to the City, never reaching S27000 in 
any one year. During the war years this revenue began to increase, 
and in the post-war period, partly because of the increase in the 
basic tax per pack of cigarettes from two to three cents, it 
climbed to a total of $14,686, or about 2.1 percent of total 
revenues. According to the (corrected) City Budget for 1952 some 
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Table 16. Manhattan's 
-1- 
tate-Shared Tax Revenue by source, 
1933-1952. 
: Sales : Cigar. : Liquor 010 gas.' ': Total : Total as 
Year: tax : tax : enf. : tax : state- : percent of 
: rev. rev. tax 
rev. 
: rev. 
: 
: 
: 
shared : 
tax rev.: 
total all 
rev. 
1933 $ 
- 
** $ IMMO $ - 
1934 702 '702 .23* 
1935 1,177 1,177 .47* 
1936 1,312 1,312 . 50* 
1937 1,402 1,402 . 57* 
1938 3,872 1,41+4 5,316 2.05* 
1939 7,350 1,479 8,829 2.67* 
1940 11,065 1,721 12,786 5.02* 
1941 24,822 2,621 271)1)13 10.54* 
1942 20,881 2,397 23,278 8.72 
1943 25,2652 
_ 
2 
4,613 
7,608 
29,878 
7,608 
11.60 
3.19 
1945 32,928 8,174 41,102 15.87 
1946 32,210 43,355 
1947 29,839 8,793 38,632 12.34 
1948 27,958 11,394 39,52 3 9.30 
1949 27,559 12,920 1,304 3,042 44, 8 25 10.97 
1950 31,171 14,279 3,140 12,001 60,591 12.44 
1951 35,036 14,686 4,358 23,050 77,130 10.93 
1952*2781 15,000 4,000 12,0003 54,781 6.94 
i-For detailed explanation of derivation of data see p. 48- 
49 abgvel especially footnote 46. 
No revenue in 1911)1 from sales tax because of delay in dis- 
tribution until 1945 by Riley County Treasurer. (Delays in dis- 
tribution partially account for uneveness of this "series" for 
entir period, 1938-1952.) 
iDecline is partly due to change in division of this fund 
among Kansas cities, and counties, but the estimate could have 
been somewhat low. 
*Total revenues include an estimate of federal aid. 
**Probably included in "Other and misc." revenue. 
***Estimates partly. 
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$15,000 was expected for this year. 
Sales Tax Revenue. The state sales tax, adopted in 1937, 
first was a source of revenue for Manhattan in 1938 when it yield- 
ed $3,872, or almost 1.5 percent of total revenue for that year. 
This revenue registered steady and substantial gains, primarily 
due to the war and post-war inflation of the "base" of the tax, 
until by 1951 Manhattan received $35,036 or almost 5 percent of 
her total revenue of $705,784 from this source. The apparent big 
reduction in the 1952 estimate from the immediately previous year 
is due to: (a) a decline in the amount available for distri- 
bution by Riley County (from $146,090 in 1951 to $143,155 in 1952) 
to Manhattan and the other political units; (b) the above noted 
(Table 16, footnote 2) delays in Riley County distribution from 
this fund; (c) a possible conservativeness in the City Budget. 
Liauor Enforcement Zaz Revenue. This state tax, at the rate 
of 2 percent of the gross receipts from the sales of intoxicating 
liquors and beverages, was designed to compensate counties and 
cities in Kansas for enforcing liquor control provisions of Kansas 
laws 79-4101 to 79-4108 of 1949. Since the period of operation 
has been so short, starting only in mid-1949, no "trend," in the 
strict sense, can be established. However, in the past three 
years the revenue increased from $1,304 in 1949 to $3,140 in 1950 
and $4,358 in 1951. 
The "One-Cent Gasoline lgz." This state revenue tax, also, 
514-Research Department, Kansas State Chamber of Commerce, 
loc. cit. 
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has been in effect only since 1949. The state gasoline tax was 
increased from four to five cents a gallon until June 30, 1953 
when it is scheduled to go back to the old rate. One-fifth of 
the additional revenue has gone to the cities and counties.55 
Manhattan's share amounted to $3,0+2 in the first year and 
$12,001 in the second, and $23,050 in 1951, when it accounted for 
3.3 percent of the total City revenues. In 1952, revenue from 
this source was expected to decline to approximately 12,000 -- 
partly due to a different division of the State Fund among the 
various Kansas cities and counties. (Also the City budget may 
have been "conservative" in its estimates). 
Manhattan's State and (Estimated) Federal Aids 56 
State Aids. The State of Kansas has had but one regular aid 
for her municipalities during the past twenty years, viz., the 
"state highway link maintenance grant." This has been, as the 
name indicates, compensation to the cities (and counties) for 
their maintaining of state highways within their political 
boundaries, being computed according to the milage of such high- 
way "links" of the various units. Manhattan, especially in the 
period 1936-1948 received almost constant yearly dollar amounts 
of slightly over one thousand dollars a year, which accounted for 
55 
,Ibid. 
"All revenue data under this heading are in Table 17, q.v., 
or derived therefrom, except as noted. 
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Table 17. Manhattan's grants-in-aid and other special aids from 
state and federal sources, 1933-1952. 
Year 
State 
grants-in-aid 1 : Various 
. 
: Total 
: state & 
: fed. aids 
: Total as 
: percent 
: of all 
: City 
revenues 
: Highway 
: link 
: maint. 
: 
: 
: 
Other 
: federal 
: aids2 
1933 
1934 
193 5 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
19W1 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952*** 
$ 1,053 
2,353 
4,377 
1,059 
1,043 
1,043 
1,043 
1,043 
1,041 
1,041 
1,041 
1,041 
1,041 
78o 
1,041 
1,065 
1,879 
4,294 
4,294 
17,000 
$ ** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
5,1593 
** 
$ 25,000* 
50,000* 
30000* 
25,000* 
30,000* 
40,000*,, 
950oo*; 
3500040 
10,000* 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
146,8796 
150,0007 
$ 26,053* 
52,353* 
34,377* 
26,059* 
31,043* 
41,043* 
96,043* 
36,043* 
11,041* 
1,041 
1,041 
1,041 
1,041 
1078o 41
1065 
1,879 
4,294 
156,332 
167,000 
12.46* 
17.50* 
13.69* 
9.89* 
12.60* 
15.86* 
29.06* 
14.15* 
4.24* 
.39 
.4o 
.3o 
.33 
.25 
.46 
.88 
22.15 
21.18 
1 For detailed explanation of derivation of data see p. 48- 
49 abpve, especially footnote 46. 
The writer's estimates, based on the special Manhattan 
"work relief" or "public works" bonds issued, specific grants 
noted below, and the general federal public works and relief 
progr4ms. 
Grant for "police radio equipment." 
14-Included approximately $27,300 received for construction of 
the tip municipal swimming pools. 
?Included $13,101 municipal airport grant. 
°$106,879 from disaster relief grant, the remainder, $40,000, 
was saved when the Army Engineers performed flood clean-up work. 
The actual cost to the army was approximately $88,000, but the 
City was prepared to spend only $40,000 for this project, had it 
been necessary, (City Manager William B. Avery, 12a. cit.). The 
private citizens would evidently have been responsible for the 
75, 
remaining clean-up work. 
/The writer's estimate, based on article by William B. 
Avery, loc. cit. He estimated a total of $300,000 would eventual- 
ly be received from this source, including the 1951 amount. 
*The writer's estimates for federal aids, or include these 
estimates. 
**Evidently none or negligible amounts. 
***Estimates. 
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from .44 percent to .25 percent of the increasing total City 
revenues. In the years 1934 and 1935 the amount was somewhat 
higher. Starting in 1949 the grant was raised to over $4,000 a 
year, and in 1952 $17,000 is expected due to a more liberal State 
policy. Information to indicate any other direct Kansas grants- 
in-aid was lacking, with one exception, a $5,159 grant in 1951 
for "police radio equipment."57 (Kansas grants for educational 
and welfare purposes go to the school districts and counties.) 
Federal Aid. Information regarding federal grants-in-aid 
was also very scanty. Approximately $27,300 was received in 1939 
for the construction of the two municipal swimming pools. $13,101 
was granted for the Municipal Airport in 1940. In 1951 a $40,000 
City expenditure for flood clean-up was avoided by the performance 
of this project by the Army Engineers (see footnote 6, Table 17 
above). The largest single federal grant was a "theoretical" 
$4622500 approved under public law 875 after the 1951 flood. 
However, "due to definitions of this law, (the City) would 
not be permitted to make expenditures for much more than $300,000 
of the approved project."58 Of this amount some $106,879 was re- 
ceived in 1951. Neither the "City Budget for 1952" nor the 
"Financial Report as of March 31, 1952" indicated how much was 
expected from this source in 1952 -- apparently because of its 
57It is possible that certain special state, and federal, 
aids have been placed under "Other and misc." receipts. A request 
to the Kansas Commission of Revenue and Taxation for detailed in- 
formation of Kansas grants to Manhattan brought the reply, "In- 
formatIon not available." 
5William B. Avery, loc. cit. 
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"special nature"; therefore the $150,000 in Table 17 was the 
writer's estimate. 
Other than the grants just mentioned, no record of specific 
federal aid was found. However, during the depression years 
1933-1941, the City benefited from several federal and at least 
one state relief and public works agencies, especially from the 
FERA and until their abolishment the KERA (which received the 
bulk of its funds from the federal government), the WPA and the 
PWA. No records were kept of the monetary value of this aid by 
the City presumably because of its emergency status in the early 
years and because of its primary form -- the labor services of 
men employed by the special agencies. These men were used in 
municipal construction and maintenance projects, e.g., sewer lay- 
ing, paving of streets, building retaining walls, etc. The city 
was usually responsible for providing the materials used as well 
as the overall supervision of the projects and other sundry ex- 
penses involved. In order to finance her share of the expenses, 
the City issued series of "work relief" and "public works" bonds. 
As a very rough and likely minimum estimation, it has been 
assumed that the value of these labor services approximately 
equaled the special bonds issued. While an estimation on such a 
basis is admittedly a very crude one, it was believed that it was 
better than no estimation at all; the history of Manhattan reve- 
nue for the period 1933-1941 would be misrepresented with its 
exclusion. 
Total State and Federal Aids. The proportion of the esti- 
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mated total state and federal aids to total revenues has been 
indicated in the last column of Table 17. (It was rather super- 
fluous to carry the figures out to a hundredth of one percent for 
the periods 1933-1942 and 1952, in view of the estimates involved. 
However, for some minor sources, e.g., state grants during 1942- 
1950, represented much less than one percent of total revenues, 
the figures were actual revenues. In order to present consistent 
tabulations, all data were carried out to the same degree.) In- 
creasing from 1933 to 1934, the proportion declined in 1935 and 
1936. It rose to an estimated $95,000 in 1939, including approx- 
imately $27,300 for the construction of two municipal swimming 
pools. This $95,000 was 28.63 percent of all City revenues for 
that year. From 1942 through 1950, Manhattan apparently received 
little or no federal or state grants, other than that from the 
regular state highway link maintenance aid. In 1951 and 1952, as 
mentioned, very substantial grants were obtained from the federal 
government. 
Summary of the Trends of the Revenue Sources of Manhattan 
(as Compared with National and Kansas Trends) 
Aggregate Revenue Trends. The data in Table 11, above, 
probably constitute the best "recap" of the trend of aggregate 
revenues of the City of Manhattan. The increase in aggregate dol- 
lar revenues through the first fifteen of the twenty year span was 
relatively slow -- and actually declined during the war years. How- 
ever in more recent years the increase has been much faster, pri- 
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marily due to inflation and, of course, to the 1951 flood. The 
1951 aggregate revenues were well over twice the 1947 receipts of 
$313,006. In view of the influence of the flood, the 1950 reve- 
nue of $486,95l would seem more "representative" of the gradually 
increasing post-war trend of aggregate revenues. 
The most noteworthy development was the sharp decline in the 
"real" per capita revenue during most of the period. A compari- 
son of Table 11 with Table 1 is informative (also cf. Table 2.). 
Although Table 1 includes all local governmental revenue, the 
cities' (of the United States) portion was 47.7 percent in the 
year 1932 (see footnote 4 above); this percentage of the 1933 
average "real" per capita "all local revenue" is $17.15, as 
compared with the 1933 "real" per capita revenue in Manhattan of 
$18.68. This would indicate that for 1933 at least Manhattan re- 
ceived about "the average" revenue for an American city. On the 
assumption that the proportion-of city to total local receipts 
remained about the same, Manhattan has been a surprisingly "repre- 
sentative American city" -- in her per capita "real" revenue. 
During most of the 1933-1941 period it was slightly higher, 
probably due to the inclusion of PWA aid, etc., in the Manhattan 
data, and in the 1941-1950 years it was slightly lower than the 
national (apparent) average. 
The Changing Importance of the Different Revenue Sources. 
The fluctuations in relative (percentage) importance of Man- 
hattan's revenue sources, classified as, (1) the general property 
tax, (2) other local taxes, (3) local (city) non-tax sources, 
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(4) state-shared taxes, and state and federal aids, has been 
summarized in Table 18 (below). To further illustrate the con- 
tinual shifts in importance of these various groups they have 
been ranked in Table 19, by year, according to their relative 
yields. 
(1) Property taxes retained their first rank throughout the 
period, but by a narrowing though fluctuating margin. (2) "Other 
local taxes" have varied from third to last in importance of the 
five groups. (3) "Local non-tax sources" have been generally in 
the third rank during the 'thirties and the second rank in the 
'forties. (4) State-shared taxes have had the most fluctuations 
in importance during the twenty years, having held every "rank" 
except first. (5) State and federal grants were the second most 
important source in the "emergency years," 1933-1940, and again 
in 1951-1952. In the years 1942-1950 they were the least impor- 
tant group of revenue sources. 
Manhattan and the National and State Revenue Trends of the 
Main Groups of Sources. (Cf. Tables 2, 3, and 18.) As outlined 
above, p. 10-26, while certain broad tendencies are apparent when 
all the larger municipalities of the country are averaged, the 
range or scatter of the individual cities from the central 
pattern is considerable. While statistics of all, American cities 
were not available, Table 2, above, summarized the trends of those 
cities over 25,000. From this Table the following groups of 
revenue sources have been expressed as percentages of the "total 
general revenue" (for the years 1943, 1945, 1947, and 1949, 
Table 18. Summary of the major sources of Manhattan by major 
revenue groups, 1933-1952 (percentages). 
Year 
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Prop. Other : Local : State : State : Total 
tax : local : non-tax: shared : & fed.*: all , 
rev. 1 : tax rev.3 tax : aid : rev.° 
rev. 2; rev: revt2: 
1933* 78.78 3,84 4.92 ** 12.46 100.00 
1934* 66.73 6.51 9.02 .23 17.50 99.99 
1935* 75.59 4.56 8.81 .47 13.69 100.0o 
1936* 71.59 9.58 8.44 .50 9.89 100.00 
1937* 68.29 9.24 9.29 .57 12.60 99.99 
1938* 65.65 6.98 9.45 2.05 15.86 99.99 
1939* 49.46 5.56 13.25 2.67 29.06 100.00 
1940* 61.09 7.49 12.26 5.02 14.15 100.01 
1941* 64.02 6.29 14.91 10.54 4.24 100.00 
1942 62.34 6.24 22.31 8.72 
.39 100.00 
1943 61.97 10.49 15.53 11.60 .40 99.99 
19)01 69.50 8.3o 18.57 3.19 .44 100.00 
1945 60.48 7.43 15.82 15.87 .4o 100.00 
1946 52.38 7.54 23.07 16.71 .3o 100.00 
1947 53.96 7.48 25.88 12.34 .33 99099 
1948 61.02 7.49 21.95 9.30 .25 100.01 
1949 57.97 8.05 22.55 10.97 .46 100.00 
19 50 54.67 10.82 21.18 .88 99099 
19 51 40.0o 10.81 16.11 10.93 22.15 100.00 
1952*** 46.85 9.79 13.14 9.05 21.18 100.01 
'From Table 12 above, p. 53. 
_,From Table 14 above, p. 62. 
Prom Table 15 above, p. 65. 
rom Table 16 above, p. 71. 
4From Table 17 above, D. 74. 
'Total of first five columns. (This indicates that most of 
the "arithmetic" had been correct, if nothing else. Differences 
from 100.00 are presumed to be due to rounding.) 
*Total revenues include estimates for federal aid, 1933- 
1941. 
**Probably included in "other and misc." revenue in the group 
of local non-tax revenues. 
***Estimates. 
Table 19. Rankings of relative importance 
Manhattan's revenue sources, 
local taxes," "local non-tax 
taxes, and state and federal 
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of the five groups of 
property taxes, "other 
sources," state-shared 
aids, 1932-1952. 
Year 
1933* 
1934* 
1935* 
1936* 
1937* 
1938* 
1939* 
1940* 
1941* 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
19 51 
1952** 
Prop. T. 
It 
tt 
tt 
ft 
ft 
tt 
tt 
ti 
tt 
ft 
ft 
It 
tt 
I! 
If 
If 
tt 
ft 
ft 
Order of importance' 
Grants 
If 
tt 
ft 
tt 
It 
It 
L.Non-T. 
If 
State S. 
L.Non-T. 
ii 
tt 
tt 
tt 
Grants 
H 
L.Non-T. 
rt 
It 
0.L.Tax 
L.Non-T. 
ft 
ft 
State S. 
ft 
ft 
0.L.Tax 
L.Non-T. 
State S. 
It 
tt 
tt 
L.Non-T. 
tt 
0.L.Tax 
tt 
It 
L.Non-T. 
0.L.Tax 
It 
ft 
ft 
rt 
ft 
tt 
State S. 
0.L.Tax 
tt 
u. 
tt 
ft 
State S. 
0.L.Tax 
State S. 
tt 
It 
tt 
tt 
tt 
it 
it 
Grants 
tt 
tt 
11 
It 
tt 
tt 
ft 
It 
tt 
0.L.Tax 
State S. 
1 According to Table 18 above, p. 81. 
*Total revenues include estimates for federal aid, this 
determines the ranking of federal and state aids, but the other 
four groups, relative to each other, have not'been affected. 
**Based on estimates. 
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respectively): Property Taxes, 66.1 percent, 63.2 percent, 56.5 
percent, and 53.3 percent; Sales taxes, 4.2 percent, 4.7 percent, 
8.0 percent, and 907 percent; Licenses and other taxes, 4.8 per- 
cent, 4.8 percent, 5.2 percent, and 6.1 percent; "Aid from other 
governments" (over 90 percent from the states) 16.9 percent, 17.9 
percent, 19.5 percent, and 20.3 percent; and "Charges and misc.", 
8.0 percent, 9.4 percent, 10.8 percent, and 10.6 percent. 
(1) Manhattan's property taxes. During these four years, 
i.e., 1943, 1945, 1947, and 1949, property taxes of Manhattan 
contributed only slightly less than the national large city aver- 
age. As compared with the average of the ten first-class cities, 
not including Kansas City or Wichita, Manhattan , for the period 
1941-1950, on the average relied somewhat on the property tax, al- 
though in 1948 this relationship was reversed by a narrow margin. 
(2) Other local taxes. The Manhattan revenue sources placed 
under this category were approximately the same as the national 
large city classification, "Licenses and other taxes" and the 
Kansas cities' "License and Privilege taxes." Manhattan's revenue 
from this group of sources yielded a somewhat higher proportion 
than that of the American large cities, and about the same, on 
the average, as those of the Kansas cities. 
(3) Local non-tax revenue. Although there may have been 
some slight differences in classification, the "Charges and 
misc." revenues of large American cities and the sum of (a) "Fines 
and fees", (b) "Charges", (c) "Trust fund receipts", and an un- 
known part of (d) the (minor) "Misc." revenue sources were apparent- 
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ly about the same sources as Manhattan's "Local non-tax revenue." 
On this assumption, Manhattan has received considerably more from 
this group of sources than has either the average large American 
city or the average first-class Kansas municipality. 
(4) State-shared tax revenue. In the summary of American 
cities (Table 2) there is no specific classification of revenue 
by this source. Apparently the group, "Aid from other govern- 
ments" included state-shared taxes other than sales taxes as well 
as grants-in-aid. However the "Shared state taxes" of the ten 
Kansas municipalities (Table 3) is quite similar, on the average, 
with the Manhattan revenue from this source. The latter received 
a higher percentage than the ten Kansas cities in the early 
'forties and a somewhat smaller portion in the latter part of 
that decade. 
(5) State and federal aid. "Aid from other governments", as 
just noted, evidently includes state-shared as well as functional 
grants-in-aid. Nevertheless many other states have been more 
liberal than Kansas in the granting of such functional grants. 
The classification of the Kansas municipalities (Table 3) did not 
include grants as a specific revenue source -- evidently because 
of their very minor nature (in the period covered). In view of 
Manhattan's negligible revenue from this source in "non-emergency" 
years, she has followed the Kansas municipal revenue pattern. 
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Manhattan's Aggregate Debt and (Approximate) 
Expenditures, 1933-1952 
While the Manhattan City expenditure and debt history were 
not the subject of this investigation, their direct and indirect 
causal relationships to the revenue history have been clear. The 
details of this debt and expenditure record have not been dealt 
with except in a few specific cases. However, it was felt that, 
at the very least, the aggregate debt and expenditure figures for 
the 1933.through 1951 period should be presented. 
As indicated by the first and second columns of Table 20, 
below, during most of the period 1935-1946 the aggregate bonded 
debt was continually and substantially reduced: in 1946 the 
aggregate dollar debt was only 36.4 percent of that of 1934. 
From 1947-1950 the debt rose sharply; the 1950 debt of $1,430,234 
was almost five times the 1946 figure. A great part of the in- 
crease was accounted for by the $500,000 municipal building bond 
issue of 1947. However due to the increasing high cost of build- 
ing construction and material shortages, and in the anticipation 
of future lowering of costs, the receipts from this issue have 
not yet been used. 
"Yearly aggregate revenues X net yearly changes in the aggre- 
gate debt" should, by definition and practice, equal "yearly ag- 
gregate expenditure yearly net changes in aggregate current 
assets." The latter term includes special funds designated for 
future expenditure, e.g., the $500,000 municipal building fund. 
As the actual City expenditures included gross expenses of the 
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Table 20. Manhattan's total bonded debt, yearly net changes in 
debt, aggregate revenues, "approximate aggregate ex- 
penditures ,L designated funds for expenditures," 
and aggregate revenues/"approximate expenditures, 
etc.," 1933-1952. 
Year 
: 
:Aggregate: 
: debt' : 
Net 
changes 
in 
debt 
:"Approximate:Agg. rev. as 
:Aggregate: aggregate : percent of 
:revenues2:expenditure;:"Appro. pxp., 
etc." : etc." 
1933 $ 773,592 $113,958 $209,166* $3231124 64.73 
1934 782,336 8,744 299,081* 307,825 97.16 1935 716,117 - 66,219 251,111* 184,892 135.81 
1936 677,129 
- 38,988 2631498* 224,510 117.37 
1937 661,267 
- 15,862 2461350* 230,488 106.88 
1938 61o16o4 - 50,663 258,856* 208,193 124.33 
193 9 573,548 - 37,056 330,537* 293,481 112.63 
1940 532,473 - 41,075 254,772* 213,697 119.22 
1941 560,082 27,609 260,312* 287,921 90.41 
1942 531,054 - 29,028 267,000 237,972 112.20 
1943 464,861 
- 66,193 257,563 191,370 134.59 
194 4 402,751 - 62,110 238,336 176,226 135.24 1945 326,781 - 75,970 259,046 183,076 141.50 
1946 284,228 - 42,553 259,463 216,910 119.62 
1947 765,937 X 481,709 313,006 794,715 39.39 
1948 1,121,698 355,761 423,345 779,106 54.34 1949 1,373,128 251,430 408,677 660,107 61.91 
1950 1,4301234 57,106 486,951 5)01057 89.5o 
1951 1,406,804 - 23,430 705,784 682,,354 103.43 
1952** 
- 
- 788,615 
1From Official Records of Manhattan City Clerk. (Debts as 
of ena of each year. The 1932 debt was $659,634.) 
From Table 11, above. 
3The sum of the second and third columns. 
4Fourth column divided into third column. 
*Include estimated federal aids. 
**Estimate. 
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Water Department, which, e.g., amounted to $94,85059 in 1943 and 
$173,73060 in 1950, and because of the availability of the debt 
and revenue figures, the above formula has been used to derive 
yearly "expenditure net changes in current assets" as an "alter- 
nate" to the actual expenditures. (See the fourth column of 
Table 20.) This time-series would appear to summarize fairly 
clearly the general relationship between aggregate revenues and 
"expenditures and approximate expenditure designations." (This 
statement would have to be qualified by the fact that the amounts 
required in the City bank balances for day to day purposes fluctu- 
ated, e.g., from $14,020 in 1936 to $60,143 in 19)01, and $88,175 
in 1950.61) 
This "index," of revenues to "expenditures, etc.," indicated 
that in seven years of the 1933-1951 period revenues were less 
than "actual and designated (future) expenditures," i.e., in 1933- 
1934, 1941, and 1947-1950. During the depression years, 1935- 
1940 the City's revenues exceeded "expenditures, etc." by a goodly 
margin (quite at odds with the doctrine of Keynes, be it noted). 
In the war years 1942-1945 this trend continued, revenues exceed- 
in- " g expenditures, etc." by an even wider margin. (For this 
inflationary period, however, it can be assumed that Keynes would 
have given his approval of these "surpluses.") The sharp increase 
of actual and "earmarked funds" for capital expenditures largely 
59 Ci ty of Manhattan Budget for 1945, 1944. 
rCity of Manhattan Budget for 1952, 1951. 
01These figures derived from sources cited in footnote 46 
above. 
accounted for the large "deficits" of the immediate post-war 
period. 
THE ISSUES OF NEW MUNICIPAL REVENUE: MANHATTAN 
AS A CASE STUDY OF A NATIONAL PROBLEM 
88 
The preceding survey of recent revenue trends of the City of 
Manhattan has been more empirical than deductive, more des- 
criptive than analytical. In many cases, however, general or 
specific (national and local) economic or non-economic forces 
which were believed to have accounted for particular secular 
trends or short-run fluctuations in her revenue have been pointed 
out. It has been assumed that the major factors and issues affect- 
ing municipal revenue in the United States discussed above under 
A SYNOPSIS OF MUNICIPAL REVENUE PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(p. 9-26) apply to the City of Manhattan. There seems little 
point in repeating in detail this discussion which is only 
slightly affected by Manhattan's local deviations from the nation- 
al pattern -- especially in view of her close ties with the 
national economic general trends, as well as the remarkable simi- 
larity with few exceptions of her aggregate and specific revenue 
trends with the national trends. (The main recent single factor 
differentiating her revenue trends was the damage wrought by the 
1951 floods. This disaster accounted for the greater part of the 
increase in revenues of 1951 and estimated 1952 and will likely 
be an influence for many years to come.) However, the following 
brief outline of future revenue issues -- particularly as they 
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apply to Manhattan, but none the less typical of the national 
problems -- seems warranted. 
Logically the main issues of future City revenue can be re- 
solved into three components: (1) How much aggregate revenue will 
Manhattan require? (2) From which sources will it be drawn? 
(3) From which sources "should" future Manhattan revenues be 
secured? (This third issue could have been included under the 
second. It has been dealt with separately to facilitate the 
separation of "facts" and the writer's value judgments -- insofar 
as that was possible.) 
How Much Revenue Will Manhattan Require? 
This, of course, like any prediction, ultimately reduces to 
the projection of past trends into the future, weighed, in some 
cases by what are conceived to be likely future changes. The 
deciding of the length of the time period upon which to base the 
trend is just one of the difficulties encountered in the pro- 
cedure. 
The statistician who is searching for a magic formula 
that will enable him to forecast automatically is fore- 
doomed to disappointment. Although it is perhaps a slight 
exaggeration, it may not be out of place to borrow from 
Dante and issue the following warning to those who approach 
the p9Ktals of prophecy: "abandon hope, all ye who enter 
here.00 
Perhaps Drs. Croxton and Cowden are exaggerating in this 
62 Frederick E. Croxton and Dudley J. Cowden, Applied General 
Statistics, 1946, p. 822. 
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condemnation of a widely-practiced "art." For example, the pre- 
dictions that "the sun will rise tomorrow," or "this apple will 
fall when it is released" would seem to have a high probability 
of coming to pass. On the other hand, the probability of "the 
aggregate revenue of the City of Manhattan being $1,003,250 in 
1960" would not seem as great. 
Such questions as, there soon be another World War?" 
or, "If not, when will another depression arrive?" or, "When will 
another local 'natural disaster' occur" are obviously unanswer- 
able, however important to the future revenue trends of Man- 
hattan they may be -- by this student at least. Similarly, the 
basic attitudes and actions of the Manhattan citizens in the 
coming years cannot be predicted with absolute certainty. How- 
ever by taking the "long-trend point of view," and disregarding 
the above, especially the "endogenous possibilities," as "random 
factors," or frictional elements in view of a long-term prospect 
of increasing population, it can be fairly safely assumed that 
the City of Manhattan will require ever increasing aggregate 
amounts of "real" revenue for the "foreseeable future." 
In sum, the future aggregate revenue requirements of Man- 
hattan will be largely determined by expenditure requirements and 
to a much lesser degree debt policy. Since the people of Man- 
hattan, over the 1935-1946 period at least, have been conserva- 
tive about deficit financing, it seems a "safe bet" that future 
expenditures will be the major determinant of the demand for ag- 
gregate revenue. More likely than not, these future aggregate 
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expenditure will continue to increase. 
Whether "real" revenue per capita will remain about that of 
the 1940-1950 average, after the flood damage is substantially 
financed, does not seem to be certain. It is quite possible that 
the municipal services per capita have reached their saturation 
point in Manhattan; on the other hand the long-run upward trend (of 
the past almost 100 years) might be continued. 
As a general rule as American cities have grown in popu- 
lation both the variety of municipal services offered has increas- 
ed. It is possible that the citizens of a future much larger 
Manhattan might demand, e.g., more city parks with more elaborate 
amusement facilities, more and bigger musical organizations, 
perhaps a museum of fine arts, and extensive street widening and 
"de-dipping" program, more and better sidewalks, better street 
lighting, summer educational programs for children, increased 
health inspection and enforcement, etc. Whether the trend will 
actually be in this direction is a moot point; the local citizen- 
ry have been quite cautious regarding such "non-essentials." 
From Which Sources Will Future Manhattan 
Revenue Be Secured? 
The recent fluctuations in the relative importance of the 
various main groups of revenue sources for Manhattan have been 
summarized in Tables 18 and 19 above. 
(1) Property Taxes. It seems not unlikely that the trend of 
rapidly decreasing relative importance of the property tax will 
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continue in Manhattan. The taxpayers in reaction against the 
high levies of 1952 -- when an all time high of $359,976 was ex- 
pected from this source -- may very well be in a mood to increase 
political pressure to ease this burden. It is also possible that 
this declining trend will level off if general economic conditions 
stabilize, or, under certain condition, e.g., if total revenues 
decline sharply, even increase in relative importance. Of the 
three possibilities the first seems the most likely. 
(2) Other Local Tax Revenues. This rather minor but in- 
creasingly important group of taxes could conceivably become of 
even greater importance in Manhattan -- if the recent trend is 
continued. The main drawback to date, in addition to local re- 
sistance, has been the lack of Kansas statutory authority for new 
types of local taxes. Of the eleven most important local non- 
property taxes in the United States (see page 18 above) only one 
was authorized by the State of Kansas for municipal use, viz. the 
public utility franchise tax.63 
(3) Local Non-Tax Revenues. These non-tax sources were, as 
a group, second in importance to property taxes in Manhattan from 
1942 through 1950, with the exception of 1945. These also, 
theoretically, could and judging by their recent history probably 
will, become of even greater relative importance. For example, 
one important source from this group, the "profits" of the City 
Water Department could, due to its monopoly position and to the 
63 
Research Department, Kansas State Chamber of Commerce, 
loc. cit. 
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inelastic demand for its product, be substantially increased. 
(Even if the rates per gallon remain the same, i.e., are not in- 
creased, as long as the population continues to grow the "net 
profit" from this source should increase. This is due to the fact 
that "water industries" normally represent illustrations of the 
classical industry of declining costs. To the point where major 
additional equipment is required, costs per gallon do not increase 
in proportion to the increased revenue. Even beyond this point 
after the immediate additional expenses have been absorbed reve- 
nue from this source will increase as the costs per gallon will 
continue to decline. This cost structure appears to hold true for 
the Manhattan water system.) Various services now given "free" 
could, be changed to a fee basis. The various fees, etc., now 
charged could be further increased. How long such a policy would 
be politically feasible is another question. 
(4) State-Shared Taxes. The future of this group of sources 
-- "third ranking" for most of the period 1941-1950 -- seems 
secure. More likely than not, judging by the recent trends and 
the evident willingness of the local people to accept "tax 
relief," state-shared taxes could become even more important in 
the future. Of more importance, however, than the willingness of 
the local governments to share state taxes is the willingness of 
the latter to do the sharing. This, as with most political 
matters, is hard to forecast. Nevertheless, the writer feels that 
the recent trend of their increasing importance probably will 
continue. Their relative decline in importance in 1951-1952 
appeared to be only temporary -- due primarily to the influx of 
federal relief aid. 
(5) State and Federal Aids. These sources of revenue, de- 
pending as they have in the past upon emergency local or national 
conditions seem the least predictable of the five groups of 
sources. In any case their availability will largely be outside 
the control of the Manhattan government. In other states these 
revenue sources, especially state grants-in-aid, have been fairly 
substantial; but the temper of the legislature of Kansas does not 
now appear to favor their future extension to a position of major 
importance. The federal government under the past twenty years of 
Democratic control have been liberal with grants and other aids. 
If the Republicans return to power this policy may be greatly 
altered. 
From Which Sources"Should" Future Manhattan 
Revenue Be Secured? 
It will be assumed that, as a group, the citizens of Man- 
hattan have been getting their "money's worth" for their tax 
dollars; the question in point is whether or not the particular 
revenue sources, and their relative importance, have been in 
their distribution of the public burden justified, and therefore 
whether they should be continued according to recent trends, or 
whether they should be more or less drastically revised. 
A tax is "a compulsory contribution from the person to 
the government to defray the expenses incurred in the common 
interest of all, without reference to special benefits 
conferred." 64 
Most economists and writers on DuPlic finance at the 
Rillatat t me have gone over to the principle of ability 
to pgy... 
There is no mystery about tax returns. Stripped of 
political and psychological considerations, there are two 
Primary sources of all taxation -- =Ruiz and income. 
No matter how much covering up is done, nor what labels are 
conceived, all taxes come back to these sources. In the 
last analysis it is better to approach these sources di- 
rectly than through subterfuges that only deceive the taz- 
2=1.6r--- 
If the above philosophy -- with which this student is in 
general agreement -- had been followed by American municipalities, 
the only taxes levied would have been direct taxes on property 
and income. (And it should be noted that income rather than 
property has more and more come to be recognized as the ultimate 
source of governmental revenue.) Under such a system the degree 
of progressiveness or regressiveness of particular and aggregate 
taxes would not necessarily be drastically changed from the 
present conditions. However the issues would be much more clear- 
cut; the obscure "net incidence" of the present jungle of largely 
shifted taxes would be greatly clarified. 
On the other hand, it may be that in some instances the 
benefit principle does seem to be the most "common sense" 
6)1E.R.A. Seligman, Essays in Taxation, 9th ed., 1921, p. 432. 
(Cited by Paul F. Gemmill and Ralph H. Blodgett, Current Economic 
Probl9ms, 3rd ed., 1947, p. 255.) 
b5Paul F. Gemmill and Ralph H. Blodgett, og cit., p. 259. 
(Underlining by this writer.) 
6bHarold M. Groves, Director of Research Staff, Report of 
the Commission on the Economic Study of Milwaukee, 19 8, p. 9. 
(Underlining by this writer.) 
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criterion of justice. 
Many persons have held in the past that a tax ... 
should be considered a payment to the governmenttiqecause of, 
and in proportion to, benefits received from it.°I 
It is this principle together with the "state-partnership" 
and the "privilege" doctrines which apparently have been the 
justification for the various and sundry municipal non-property 
taxes (as well as charges). Other revenue sources, e.g., the 
dog tax, the cigarette tax, the liquor enforcement tax have been, 
at least in theory, more in the nature of penalties designed to 
indicate social disapproval of so-called vices and nuisances. 
In the final analysis the goodness or badness of a particular 
revenue system -- like so many economic and political matters -- 
is decided along the lines of the general philosophy of the 
judger and cannot be absolutely "proven" or "disproven." From 
the major doctrines propounded to justify the various distribu- 
tions of the public burden, i.e., the benefit doctrine, the privi- 
lege doctrine, the State-partnership doctrine, the objective 
ability doctrine, the subjective sacrifice doctrine, etc., a 
judicious selection can exonerate practically anv scheme. Since 
this study has not definitely established (a) the degree of 
shifting of the tax burden (of either Manhattan or American 
cities in general) or (b) the degree of the aggregate burden, 
this writer's personal judgment on their ultimate justice or in- 
justice is not offered. 
6 7 Pau1 F. Gemmill and Ralph H. Blodgett, on. cit., p. 264. 
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Purpose. The intent of this investigation was to determine 
trends of revenues, in the aggregate and by sources, of the city 
of Manhattan, Kansas. In addition, it was desired to discover 
the main causes, particularly the economic causes, which were re- 
sponsible for the shaping of these revenue trends. 
Manhattan revenue was defined as "all those gross receipts -- 
primarily, but not wholly in monetary form, i.e., including other 
economic goods and services (from such federal agencies as the 
P.W.A. and the W.P.A.) -- received by the City of Manhattan from 
any source, with the exceptions of (a) long or short-term borrow- 
ings and (b) general receipts of the City Water Department." 
The Problem. The problem was basically (1) the establish- 
ment of the quantitative time-series of the monetary history of 
the various revenues, aggregate and particular, of the City and 
(2) the ascertainment of the causes of the characteristics of 
these time-series. 
The General Method. The general method was essentially his- 
torical-descriptive. The nature of part (1) of the problem 
determined its solution, i.e., the simple (but time-consuming) 
procedure of locating and synthesizing the available revenue 
statistics, which had been distributed by City function or fund. 
Part (2) of the problem was more complex; causal relation- 
ships in the social sciences are difficult to establish with any 
degree of certainty. The starting point hypothesis was that the 
revenue history of the City of Manhattan was fairly representa- 
tive of revenue histories of municipalities throughout the United 
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States. A brief survey was made of American municipal revenue 
history (for cities over 25,000 for most statistics, cities over 
10,000 for some -- data for all cities were not available). 
A knowledge of the basic economic structure and economic 
trends of Manhattan was essential to a comprehensive understanding 
of her revenue history; therefore the next step was an attempt to 
establish at least a first approximation of this history, pri- 
marily by a study of various quantitative economic indicators. 
After Manhattan's economic structure and trends were ascertained, 
they, and especially the economic trends, were compared with that 
of the so-called average large American city. In the same manner 
her revenue trends were compared with the national municipal 
revenue trends, and also with the revenue trends of ten first- 
class Kansas cities. 
Principal Results Obtained. Time series were established for 
specific Manhattan revenue sources and for the aggregate revenue 
for the period 1933-1952, with estimates for the last year. (Due 
to the difficulties involved in obtaining earlier st4tistics, it 
was felt that in the time available much more could be accomplish- 
ed by concentrating the major portion of the investigation on 
this recent twenty-year period.) The most noteworthy trend of 
aggregate revenues, reduced to "real" dollars per capita, was its 
decline during the years 1943-1949 to a level approximately 55 
percent of the 1933-1942 average, e.g., $19.18 in 1936 to $10.62 
in 1946. This decline was in great part due to the existence of 
major aids from federal agencies, e.g., the P.W.A. and the W.P.A. 
io6 
in the 1933-1941 years (largely in the form of labor used to lay 
sewers, pave streets, lay sidewalks, etc., upon which this writer 
placed an estimated valuation). 
The changes in relative importance of the major groups of 
revenue can be illustrated by the comparison of their 1935 per- 
centage contribution to total revenues with the contributions in 
1950 (a post-war, pre-flood year): (1) property taxes, 1935, 75.6 
percent, 1950, 54.7 percent; (2) other local taxes, 4.6 percent 
and 10.8 percent; (3) local non-taxes, 8.8 percent and 21.2 per- 
cent; (4) state-shared taxes, 0.5 percent and 12.4 percent; and 
(5) state and federal aids, 13.7 percent and 0.9 percent. In 
1951 state and federal aids, primarily the latter, amounted to 
22.1 percent of Manhattan's total revenues. 
Causes of the fluctuations from the long-range trend aggre- 
gate revenues per capita (in "real" dollars) as well as the 
trends of the main categories of revenue sources seemed largely 
due to nationwide phenomena -- business cycles, the effects of 
World War II, and the Korean War. To a less extent local changes 
and occurrences were determinants, e.g., the floods of 1951, the 
hailstorm of 1950, and changes in number and composition of 
Manhattan's "economic population". 
In general, the similarity between the Manhattan and the 
national large city and the average of ten first-class Kansas 
cities was remarkable, i.e., the starting point hypothesis seemed 
essentially valid. (1) Her property taxes, relative to the `total 
revenue, yielded slightly less than the national large city aver- 
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age. The ten Kansas municipalities relied on this source somewhat 
more than did Manhattan. (2) Manhattan's percentage from "other 
local taxes" was about the same as the ten Kansas cities and a 
little higher than that from the large American cities. (3) She 
received considerably more from local non-taxes than did either 
of the two "comparison groups". (4) The national statistics on 
state-shared revenue apparently overlapped with that from state 
aids. However the percentages from this source for the ten Kansas 
cities were quite similar, on the average for the 1941-1950 
period, to those of Manhattan. (5) The data of the ten Kansas 
cities did not include federal and state aid as a separate item, 
apparently including it as "miscellaneous" revenue. This is in 
substantial accord with the trend of Manhattan data for this 
period, i.e., she received only negligible amounts from this 
source. Other states were more liberal with grants-in-aid to 
their local units. 
As an appendix to the Manhattan revenue history, her aggre- 
gate debts for the period 1933-1951 were indicated. From this 
data and the previously derived aggregate revenue data for the 
same period a further derivation developed a new series, "aggre- 
gate expenditures X aggregate changes in current assets". Ac- 
cording to these criteria the City operated "in the black" during 
1935-1946, and 1951 and "in the red" in 1933-1934, 1941, and 1947- 
1950. 
It was concluded that Manhattan's revenue system, like the 
typical Kansas and American city, was largely "justified" by tbb 
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benefit-principle rather than the ability-to-pay doctrine. How- 
ever, since the study had not definitely established (a) the 
degree of shifting of the tax burden (of either Manhattan or Amer- 
ican cities in general) or (b) the degree of regressiveness of the 
aggregate burden, this writer's judgment on their ultimate 
Justice or injustice was not given. 
